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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences 
across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household 
characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of 
debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we 
examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data 
from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured 
debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of 
asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In 
countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the 
youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage 
interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the 
taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust 
results. 
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1 Introduction
New micro data reveal striking differences in the incidence, amount and cost of debt held by
comparable households across countries in the Euro area. Not only the aggregate use of secure
and unsecure debt varies but also the age-cohort profiles are markedly different for different
countries. For example, nearly half of all Dutch households hold secure debt while only one in
ten Italian households do (hold such debt). Debt-to-income ratios of Austrian debt holders are
three times smaller than those of Dutch households. Age-cohort profiles of debt holding itself
are flat in Italy, steeply decreasing in Spain, and increasing in the Netherlands. The purpose of
this paper is to document these differences and to find out to what extent they are associated
with cross-country differences in legal and economic institutions.
We use the new Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), a harmonized survey
that contains information on household demographics, debt, wealth and income across euro
area countries. We also use quantitative indicators of institutions and credit conditions in the
different countries. We proceed in two steps. In the first one, we run country–specific regressions
of secured debt outcomes on a parsimonious set of household characteristics that includes age,
schooling, labor status of core household members as well as household income and size. We
examine three secured debt outcomes: the fraction of households with debt, the average amount
borrowed and the interest rate on the mortgage that financed the house of residence. In a second
stage, we relate such country–specific estimates to various institutions and credit conditions.
The country specific estimates we use are the probability, the average amount of debt held and
the interest rate paid by the reference group household as well as measures of the age-cohort,
income, self-employment and schooling profiles.1 The institutions whose role we analyze are
legal enforcement of contracts – measured by the time needed to repossess a house –, several
indicators of the tax treatment of mortgage payments, regulatory loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) at
origination, depth of information about borrowers and credit conditions, including the prevalence
of fixed rate mortgages or products that result in low initial mortgage repayments.2 We first
conduct a separate analysis of each institution and then examine the robustness of the results in
a multivariate setting.
We note three advantages of our strategy. Firstly, the two-step approach we follow leads
to effects of the institutional variables on household debt which have causal validity under less
restrictive conditions than a pooling of the data across countries with interactions of key house-
hold characteristics and institutional variables. Specifically, when estimating the cross effects of
institutions and household characteristics we allow for endogeneity with respect to unobserved
country effects, both additive and interacting with the remaining household characteristics.
1The reference group is a two-person household with the median income in the country, where both members
are aged between 35 and 44 years, have mid schooling levels, where the core member with the highest earnings is
an employee, and the other core member works. In addition, the HFCS is a cross-section, so in the remainder of
the paper we use the shorthand age-profile for what really is an age-cohort profile.
2ECB (2009), World Bank (2012) or Andrews and Caldera (2011) report the substantial heterogeneity of these
institutions across countries in the Euro area.
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Secondly, we consider many institutions. We conduct one-by-one analyses of the impact
of institutions on various debt outcomes which permits an assessment of the merits of each
institution in accounting for age and income profiles of borrowing. Additionally, this allows us
to assess how our results connect to the theoretical and quantitative papers in the literature that
typically deal with one institution at a time. We also propose a multivariate analysis to establish
which institutions matter most. Given the limited number of countries used, we make inference
considering that the moments of interest are the within sample (i.e. Euro area) regressions of
the first stage coefficients on each institution.
Finally, we assess the explanatory power of each institution by examining its impact on three
separate debt outcomes: the extensive margin (the fraction of households who borrow secured or,
in a separate specification, unsecured), the intensive margin (the amount of secured or unsecured
debt borrowed, conditional on borrowing), and the cost of secured debt. The advantage of this
approach is that it provides indications about the channel through which each institution affects
borrowing behavior. For example, Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) document that in countries with
higher down-payment requirements young adults become home owners later in the life cycle
supporting models that emphasize the presence of quantity restrictions in the credit market.
Nevertheless, high down-payments, or a low use of debt may be due to credit rationing or to a
high interest rate. Information on the determinants of cross country variation in interest rates
allows disentangling between those alternative explanations.
On the downside, our second stage is based on correlations using a sample of only eleven
countries. This is necessarily so, because at the end of the day, that is the variation available
in the data. The situation would be exactly the same in a pooled regression. Nevertheless, as
with other studies performing this type of inference, we supplement our evidence using scatter
– plots of the results and looking at a variety of outcomes – trying to rule out the case that an
institution correlates with a particular debt outcome “by chance”.
The findings of the first stage show marked differences in the patterns of debt holding across
euro area countries. In terms of explaining debt holdings within countries, we find the age,
income and education level of household members to be important demographic considerations.
In this context, we find evidence of a hump-shaped profile of secured debt holding over age-
cohort groups. Specifically, the propensity to borrow peaks for cohorts aged 35-44 at the time
of the survey, before the (cross-sectional) income profile peaks, possibly suggesting a role for
secured debt in smoothing household consumption. Nevertheless, cross-country differences in
the age, income and education profiles of borrowers are substantial. There is also substantial
heterogeneity in how mortgage interest rates are related with income or age across countries.
Our findings from the second stage suggest that among all the institutions we consider, the
length of repossession periods best explains the features of the distribution of debt we analyze.
In countries with one standard deviation longer repossession procedures, and holding the rest of
characteristics constant at those of the reference group, the fraction of borrowers is 16 per cent
smaller, the amount borrowed by the youngest set of households (conditional on borrowing) is
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12 per cent lower, and the interest rates paid by low (high) income households are 0.3 percentage
points higher (lower). These results are robust to the inclusion of other institutions. Perhaps
surprisingly, given the macro evidence in other studies that examine corporate and household
debt jointly, the availability of information about borrowers does not robustly correlate with the
patterns we study. Our measures of the impact of the remaining institutions – regulatory LTVs,
the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) –,
or of country-level financial literacy delivers less robust results.3
One interpretation of our results is that the supply of secured debt is affected by legal processes
that delay the recovery of collateral in case of non-repayment. We also find that banks react
to expected losses due to longer repossession periods not necessarily by rationing quantities
or rejecting applications but also by pricing secured debt differently across income groups and
charging relatively higher interest rates to low income households.
Theoretical and quantitative models have stressed the role of each of these institutions in
shaping the distribution of debt outcomes among age or income groups. In particular, the
models of Chambers et al.(2009a) and Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1999, 2006) analyze the impact
of Loan- to- Value ratios on the chances of young and low-income households holding debt.
Another strand of the literature discusses how the supply and distribution of debt is affected by
bank losses in the event of non-repayment, measured as the opportunity and uncertainty costs of
longer repossession processes (Jappelli et al, 2005), or by the presence of the bankruptcy option -
Livshits et al (2007), or Chatterjee et al (2007). Gervais (2002) uses an OLG model to show that
tax exemption for the implicit rents of owner occupied housing and mortgage payments leads mid-
and high-income households to anticipate housing consumption over the life cycle. Regarding
the role of depth of information, Edelberg (2006) discusses the consequences of the increased
possibilities of credit scoring that occurred during the 1990s in the US on the pricing of default
risk. As default risk varies across observable groups of the population, improved information
has differential effects on different groups. Chambers et al (2009b) simulate a strong impact of
mortgage products that result in low initial payments mostly on the borrowing behavior of young
or low-income adults. Finally, Campbell and Cocco (2003) use simulations suggesting that the
fixed rate mortgages are most attractive for the borrowing behavior of households with riskier
income profiles. In sum, the studies mentioned stress that variation in each institution -legal
enforcement, bankruptcy, taxation or Loan to Values- has heterogeneous impacts on the debt
outcomes of different households.
Previous empirical studies have fitted cross country regressions of total private sector debt-
to-GDP ratios to indicators of law enforcement, information about borrowers and legal origins
to disentangle their relative importance in determining cross-country variation in debt levels
(Djankov et al, 2007, Jappelli et al 2005). As mentioned above, the theoretical literature stresses
that those institutions affect not only aggregate debt outcomes, but also the composition of
3We also conducted the second step for unsecured debt, by regressing country specific coefficients on measures
of the depth of information or on financial literacy. Neither of those institutions was systematically correlated
with the features of the distribution of unsecured debt we analyze.
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borrowers along dimensions like income levels, age or the riskiness of borrowers’ income profiles.
In addition, economic theory also predicts that the (individual-specific) price of debt changes
with differences in legal enforcement or the depth of information about borrowers. In sum,
analyzing how cross-country variation in legal enforcement, taxation of mortgages or regulation
of credit markets correlates with different age or income profiles of debt outcomes allows a deeper
understanding of “what institutions matter most”.
An alternative empirical approach pools observations from different provinces or states within
the same country to test if more generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions in the US - Gropp
et al (1997)- or lengthier of repossession periods across Italian provinces -Fabbri and Padula
(2003)- result in a lower amount of debt granted to low-asset households. Those studies inter-
act wealth with the institution of interest. However, the theoretical models mentioned predict
that banks use all available information to price loans Therefore, variation in repossession pe-
riods may affect the age or income profile, unlike what is assumed in those empirical studies.
Georgarakos et al. (2010) specify country-specific models linking household characteristics to
subjective measures of financial distress, arguing that a higher financial burden increases finan-
cial distress relatively more in European countries with less expanded credit markets. Crook and
Hochguertel (2007) document large differences in income and demographics in country-specific
models of loan application rejections and of the amount of debt, interpreting that institutions
may explain cross-country variation in coefficients.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents an overview of the
data used in this paper. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical approach employed to examine
debt across euro area countries. Section 4 presents the results from the first part of our empirical
investigation. In Section 5 we present the results from the second part of the empirical analysis,
where we assess the impact of institutions and credit conditions on the first stage results and
compare the economic magnitude of our results to the previous literature. Finally, in Section 6,
we conclude.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
This paper uses newly available data from the first wave of the Household Finance and Consump-
tion Survey (HFCS) to study household debt in euro area countries. The HFCS is a Eurosystem
initiative aimed at collecting comparable micro-level information on household balance sheets.
It is a unique survey in that it collects information on household income, assets, liabilities and
consumption that is comparable across euro area countries.4 The first wave of the survey was
conducted between end-2008 and mid-2011, with the majority of countries carrying the survey
out in 2010. Fifteen euro area countries are included in the first wave of the survey. However,
4Further information on the survey can be found at http://www.ecb.int/home/html/researcher_hfcn.en.
html
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the analysis in this paper is based on the HFCS data for only eleven of these countries since
some of the variables important to this study are missing from four of the country datasets.5
Full details of the sampling methodology employed for the HFCS are available in HFCN (2013),
but here we set out some of the main features. The HFCS was conducted to provide nationally
representative information for each country in the dataset, resulting in a total sample size of just
over 62,000 households. The surveys in each country were conducted under the responsibility
of the respective central banks while the European Central Bank coordinated the effort across
countries. The surveys follow common methodological guidelines for their implementation, in
particular for the definition of the variables and the preparation of the data for analysis.
2.1 Questions on household debt
The HFCS includes a number of questions on household debt, and these form the basis for the
analysis in this paper. In relation to secured debt, households are asked to provide detailed
information on the quantity and terms of debt secured on the household’s main residence, and
separately for loans secured on other properties. Specifically, respondents are asked to provide
information about the loan terms at the time of origination as well as current information such
as the amount outstanding, the current interest rate and the monthly repayment. For the
purposes of this paper, we focus on the current outstanding balance of debt secured against the
main residence or some other property, as well as the current interest rate applying to the first
important loan that, according to the respondent, is collateralized by the primary dwelling. In
the case of unsecured consumer loans respondents are asked to provide similar information.6
Additionally, the HFCS includes information on the amounts outstanding on credit cards and
credit line/overdrafts. For unsecured debt, the analysis that follows employs information on the
current outstanding balance of all these types of unsecured debt.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of households with secured or unsecured debt, the average
balances on such debt (as a proportion of household income), and the average current interest
rate chargeable on the main mortgage, across the countries in the HFCS dataset.7 It is clear
that debt holding varies quite a bit across euro area countries. In the case of secured debt, the
proportion of households with such debt ranges from a low of around 10 per cent in Italy or
Slovakia to a high of almost 45 per cent in the Netherlands. For unsecured debt, the proportions
range from a low of 17 to 18 per cent in Italy and Portugal to a high of just over 35 per cent
in the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These results are in keeping with the findings from other
data sources. For example, using data from the European Community Household Panel survey,
5In the case of Cyprus, we are missing information on the education level and marital status of core household
members (excluding the reference person). For Malta, public information on the age of household members is
missing (and the number of indebted households in the sample is low). The Finnish dataset does not include
disaggregated data on secured and unsecured lending. Finally, we exclude Slovenia from the analysis since there
are so few households in the sample with outstanding debt.
6In the HFCS there is no information for the credit card interest rates neither for the outstanding debt
associated with leasing contracts.
7In Figure 1 we do not control for differences in fieldwork period across countries (but do so in our econometric
analysis).
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Georgarakos et al (2010) find a relatively low proportion of households in countries like Italy,
Spain and Greece with secured debt, despite the fact that home ownership rates are particularly
high in these countries. Conversely, they find relatively high rates of mortgage take-up in the
Netherlands.
The second chart in Figure 1 reports the median debt-to-income ratio for secured and unse-
cured debt across households in the euro area. It is clear that there is considerable heterogeneity
across countries in the amount of debt held. Households in the Netherlands hold the largest
amount of secured and unsecured debt, as a proportion of their income, while households in
Austria hold the lowest amount of secured debt. Unsecured debt holdings, relative to income,
are lowest in Austria, Germany and Slovakia.
There is also quite a bit of variability across countries in the interest rate payable on the
mortgage that financed the house of residence. The third chart in Figure 1 shows that the
median rate is lower than average in Portugal, Luxembourg, and Austria.
Finally, Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present an overview of the debt holdings, socio-economic and
demographic characteristics of households in the sample. Table 1.1 shows the data that was
reported above in Figure 1, along with estimated standard deviations. Table 1.2 reports the
proportion of households with various socio-economic and demographic characteristics. The
percentage of households whose reference person is below 35 years of age varies markedly across
countries in the sample. While less than 9% of Italian or Portuguese households have a reference
person aged below 35, the percentage exceeds 17% in France, Germany, Greece or Slovakia.
Furthermore, there is quite a bit of variability in the distribution of educational attainment
across countries. In Austria, for example, 16.2 per cent of households have a “core” member with
a tertiary education level.8 At 43.8 per cent, this figure is much higher in Belgium.
The labour status variables show the current working status of core household members. The
Netherlands reports the highest proportion of inactive or unemployed core members; almost 30
per cent of households in the Netherlands have a core household member with this status. Slo-
vakia reports the highest proportion of households where the other core member is also employed
(i.e. if the household comprises a couple, the other member of the couple is employed). The
final row in Table 1 reports the median household income across the countries in the sample.
Median household income levels are highest in Luxembourg, at almost 65,000 euros, and lowest
in Slovakia, at 11,200 euros.
8We define the “core” members of the household as the respondent to the survey and his or her partner (if
any). In examining the characteristics of “core” household members, we focus on the characteristics of that person
with the highest value (i.e. in the case of age, we focus on the eldest core member, in the case of education, we
focus on that person with highest education level, etc.). “Core” household members will be explained in further
detail in Section 3.
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3 Empirical methodology
This paper has two aims; first, to identify differences across euro area countries in the relation-
ship between household characteristics and debt holdings; and second to examine the role of
institutions in accounting for these differences. To achieve these aims, our empirical approach
includes two parts. In the first part, we estimate the role of socio-economic and demographic
factors in driving the likelihood of holding debt, the amount of debt held, and the interest rate
payable on debt. This is done by estimating country-specific equations, thus allowing for country
effects both in intercepts and slopes. In the second part, we regress a selection of the first-step
coefficients on relevant country-level legal and financial institutions, credit conditions and finan-
cial literacy variables. We focus on those coefficients from the first part – typically age, income
and education – that, as we discuss in Section 3.1. and in Section 5, are most likely to be affected
by cross-country variation in these institutions. In what follows we discuss the specification of
the model.
3.1 Modelling background
The most stylized version of the permanent income model predicts that consumer’s desired non-
durable consumption is proportional to his or her stream of future earnings, discounted at the
lending or borrowing rate - with a proportionality factor that depends on the degree of consumer’s
patience and on his or her willingness to transfer consumption across periods.9 Holding such
preference shifters constant, the desired amount of debt is then determined by household’s current
income and by the discounted stream of future earnings.10 Cross-country variation in the share of
young households -whose income is typically below their discounted stream of future earnings- or
in the share of individuals with high education levels –who typically expect higher income growth-
would then account for differences in the distribution of debt. In addition, as collateralized debt
is the main component of household debt and housing is a good consumed jointly by all household
members, the demographic characteristics of both core members is likely to affect the amount
borrowed. The exposure to high income risk –proxied by employment status- may attenuate the
incidence, amount or even the response of debt outcomes to current and future income, but the
main patterns described above are likely to remain unaffected –see Blundell and Stoker (1999).
However, uncertainty about the borrower’s ability to repay debt makes it likely that the
distribution of the amount borrowed is not driven exclusively by demand factors –see Dynan and
Kohn, 2007. Lenders typically limit the amount of debt granted to an individual as a fraction
of the value of the asset purchased or as a fraction of her current income. More generally, the
optimal pricing of debt sets higher interest rates to groups that, according to the information
9Those predictions are not specific of models without housing consumption. For example, if housing consump-
tion could be adjusted without cost, and individuals had homothetic preferences for non-durable goods and for
housing services, the desired amount of both items would also depend on the discounted stream of future income.
10Preference factors are likely to vary across countries –impatience or the curvature of the utility function. Such
preferences alone would also explain cross-country differences in the prevalence or amount of debt. Unfortunately,
self-reported information on the degree of patience or risk aversion were not collected in countries like Finland or
France, so we do not control for them in our study
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available, are more likely to default on their loans. Chatterjee et al (2007) prove that the menu of
contracts offered to borrowers entails different combinations of debt amounts and interest rates
to groups with different ages, earning capacity or current assets. Cross-country differences in the
degree of legal enforcement or in access to past information about borrowers is likely to generate
different ways of pricing non-repayment risk, thus altering the distribution of the incidence and
the amount of debt across groups of the population.
Our implicit assumption is that the cross-country variation in legal enforcement, taxation,
mortgage regulation or information about borrowers generates varying distributions of the frac-
tion of households indebted, the amount and the cost of debt across groups of the population.
Our approach does not attempt to recover credit demand or credit constraints but relies in-
stead on reduced-form separate regressions of the three outcomes of interest on the set of socio-
demographic determinants mentioned above. The country-specific estimates of the age, income
or schooling profile of debt outcomes we estimate reflect a mixture of supply and demand factors.
In a second step, we examine how country-specific institutions affect those coefficients separately.
That strategy permits inferring if an institution affects debt outcomes through demand or supply
channels. For example, if shorter repossession periods result in higher amounts of debt by some
groups while they do not increase the cost of debt, one could infer that speedier repossessions
operate mainly by increasing the supply of loans.
There are factors that may enter the demand of debt or that banks use to price loans that
we do not consider. We deliberately leave out variables related to household wealth and changes
in aggregate housing prices. House ownership is mechanically linked to debt holding through
the budget constraint, as most collateralized loans require purchasing or already owning a home.
Similarly, financial wealth varies systematically around the moment of house purchase –see Ejar-
que and Leth-Sorensen, 2009- so holding financial wealth constant in the analysis would confound
the debt response to increased collateral with distance since house purchase. In a similar vein, we
do not include housing price dynamics, as variation in the institutions we analyze in the second
step have a separate impact on housing prices through the credit market –see Ortalo-Magné and
Rady, 2006 on how variation in Loan to Value restrictions alter house price dynamics.11 In sum,
we mostly confine the set of regressors to socio-demographic variables that are least likely to be
determined by credit market developments.
The independent variables used at the first stage of the analysis are shown in Table 2.
3.2 Modelling strategy
Namely, our first step is to run separate regressions on the micro-data of each country to
obtain estimates β̂0c, β̂1c, β̂2c for each country c in an equation of the form (here there are only
two household characteristics x1hc, x2hc for the sake of simplicity):
11On the other hand, the inclusion of housing prices amounts to taking a position on whether housing prices
determine borrowing or the opposite, an issue that is unsettled in the literature (see Mian and Sufi, 2011 vs
Adelino et al. 2012 for recent discussions in the US).
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yhc = β0c + β1cx1hc + β2cx2hc + εhc (c = 1, ..., C)
Where yhc denotes one of three different outcomes in three different sets of regressions.12 In a
first specification, the outcome is 1(Dhc = 1), a dummy variable indicating the ownership of debt
for household h in country c (where c = AT,BE,DE, ..., SK). In this particular case, as detailed
below, the model is non-linear, specifically a Logit. In a second specification, the dependent
variable is log(Dhc), the logarithm of the outstanding debt amount for those households with
debt. Finally, in a third specification, the dependent variable is ihc the interest rate payable on
the first loan that, according to the household, is secured by the household’s primary residence.13
x1hc and x2hc reflect the socio-economic and demographic characteristics discussed in the previous
subsection for household h in country c.
Our second step is to run a sequence of regressions on country-level data (11 observations),
one for each β in the first step. For example, we obtain estimates (γ̂20, γ̂21) from a regression of
the β̂2c on zc , our measure of country-specific legal and financial institutions, credit conditions
or financial literacy
β̂2c = γ20 + γ21zc + v0c,
Where v0c is an error term that captures unobserved country-level variables, as well as possible
specification errors.
The estimates (γ̂20, γ̂21) are identical to the estimates one would obtain from running a re-
gression at household level, pooling all the countries, including country fixed effects not only as
intercepts but also interacted with x1ic. Such pooled regression would be as follows:
yhc = β0c + β1cx1hc + γ20x2hc + γ21zcx2hc + uhc (1)
This regression (and our second step estimates) takes into account that the institutional
variables zc may affect the impact of other socioeconomic characteristics simultaneously. Those
effects are subsumed within the country effects β0c and β1c, which capture all country differences
both observed and unobserved in the relationship, except for those operating through x2hc.The
coefficient of the interaction zcx2hc on household debt would not be biased by either reverse
causality or omitted country-level variables that operate through additive country effects β0c or
slope country effects β1c.
12All models are weighted by the population weights for each country and take into account the five implicate
data sets obtained from multiple imputation (see HFCN, 2013).
13To correct for differences in fieldwork periods across countries, we make some adjustments to the specifications
when using the log debt amount and the interest rate as dependent variables. In the case of the debt amounts
specification, we convert all monetary amounts to 2010 values by adjusting by the country-specific HICP index.
In the case of interest rates, we adjust the reported interest rate by the change of the Euribor rate between the
fieldwork period and the first quarter of 2010 multiplied by the country-specific share of adjustable mortgages.
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An alternative to our two-step approach would be a pooled regression with, for example,
additive country fixed effects but constraining βkc = γ∗k0 + γ
∗
k1zc, where k = 1, 2.
yic = β
∗∗
0c + γ
∗
01zc + γ
∗
10x1hc + γ
∗
11zcx1hc + γ
∗
20x2hc + γ
∗
21zcx2hc + u
∗
hc (2)
Note that equation (2) is a special case of equation (1) subject to the restriction β1c = γ∗10 +
γ∗11zc. In this case the estimated effects γ̂∗∗11 or γ̂∗∗21 will have causal validity only under more
restrictive conditions than γ̂11 or γ̂21. For example γ̂∗∗11 and γ̂∗∗21 allow for additive country
effect endogeneity but not for country-effect endogeneity operating interactively through other
household characteristics14.
There are two possible interpretations of the estimates γ20 and γ21. A weak interpretation of
γ̂01, γ̂11, γ̂21 is that these reflect unbiased predictive (not causal) effects of the corresponding β′s.
In our view, assessing the predictive ability of institutional variables in explaining differences
in debt held by comparable households across Euro-area countries is in itself of considerable
economic interest.15 An alternative and stronger claim is that γ21 reflects the causal impact of
the institution zc on the borrowing profile defined by x2hc. That interpretation requires ruling
out endogeneity with respect to interacted country effects, arguably present in an observational
cross-sectional setting such as ours. We note two points here. Firstly, as mentioned above the
two step procedure we follow implies that each individual coefficient γ21 would be biased if an
omitted institution were correlated with the interaction zcx2hc, but not if it were correlated with
other country fixed effect or slope country effect. In that sense each individual estimated effect
has a stronger claim to causal validity than any effect estimated from, for example, the pooled
regression (2). Secondly, we check for the relevance of confounding country-specific factors by
regressing β̂2c on several institutions zc at the same time. By comparing the estimated the impact
of zc on β̂2c across univariate and multivariate specifications we obtain indications of whether
the estimated γ21 is causal.
Regarding inference, Appendix A.1 shows that the standard errors of (γ̂20, γ̂21) in our two-
step regression can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is associated to the variance
of v0c, a source of error that arises if we interpret the 2nd stage as estimating regressions in
an underlying super population of countries. The second part takes into account the first step
estimation error β̂c − βc. The conventional standard errors in second-step regressors for results
that consider one institution at a time reflect uncertainty in the estimated coefficients in the first
step and in the fit of the second stage. However, in a separate specification, we regress β̂c on
as many as seven institutions. In that case, we present standard errors that take into account
14Bryan and Jenkins (2013) investigate the reliability of estimates of a model similar to (2) that explains
female labor supply. They conduct a Monte Carlo Analysis that reproduces the distribution of demographic
characteristics of ten European countries in EU-SILC and report that the standard errors obtained by a multilevel
model, especially suited for this data structure, are severely understated. The authors recommend conducting a
two step approach.
15To fix ideas, assume that there is a country-specific omitted characteristic like "thrift" that results both in
a lower regulatory Loan to Value and in a smaller response of the debt amount of young households to Loan to
Values. In such scenario, our estimate of γ21 would not reflect a causal impact of Loan to values on the indebtedness
of the youth. However, the statement that “holding income and a wide set of demographics constant, in Euro
area countries with lower Loan to Values indebted youths borrow relatively less” would still be correct.
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only the sampling variability due to estimated β̂c − βc, implicitly assuming that the moment of
interest is the within-sample regression of the first step coefficients on a set of country-specific
institutions. Our second step results in that case would have little to say about the relationship
in the population of countries. The standard errors that only take into account that the β̂c are
estimated coefficients are comparable to the conventional standard errors calculated by default
in the pooled version of the 2nd stage estimator as described in equation (1).
3.3 The first step: models of debt outcomes
In the first step, as mentioned above, we employ three different specifications where the
dependent variable is a different debt outcome in each specification. In the first specification,
we model the ownership of debt as a function of the socio-economic and demographic features
of households in the sample. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we model the holding
of secured and unsecured debt separately since the decisions to hold debt and to purchase a
house are potentially linked. In the case of secured debt, the dependent variable equals one if
the household has a loan that is secured on the primary residence or some other property. For
unsecured debt, the dependent variable equals one if the household has unsecured debt such
as credit cards, overdrafts, consumer loans or loans from informal sources such as family and
friends. Since the dependent variable is binary, we use discrete dependent variable techniques
and employ a logit model of the following form:
P (Has(Un)SecDebthc = 1|Xhc) = exp(B
T
c Xhc)
1 + exp(BTc Xhc)
Where: BTc Xhc = B1c +B2c ∗Age16_34hc +B3c ∗Age45_54hc + ...+B16c ∗ Log(Yhc)
and c = AT,BE,DE, ..., SK
In comparing the results across countries, we focus on the odds ratio for each variable of inter-
est since, in the case of a Logit, this parameter is invariant to different values of the covariates.
We also examine the probability of a common reference group holding debt across the countries
in our sample. This group is defined as those households comprising two core members in a
couple and no other adults in the household, where the relevant core members are aged 35 to
44 years, have a medium education level, are both employed, and the household has the median
income level in their country.
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In the second specification, we use OLS techniques to model the quantity of debt held, con-
ditional on holding debt.16 We also use quantile regression techniques to assess if the impacts
of the independent variables on the quantity of debt held differ across the conditional debt dis-
tribution. To some extent the quantile model also captures potential nonlinearities due to the
fact that the quantity of debt cannot be negative. The third and final specification in this first
part of the analysis sets the interest rate payable on the mortgage for the household’s principal
dwelling as the dependent variable. As with the second specification, we employ OLS techniques
and a location-scale model that accounts for potential heteroscedasticity.
We include those demographic characteristics of “core” household members that are thought
to be important determinants of debt holdings, as well as information on household composition
and household income. We define the core members of the household as the respondent to the
survey and his or her partner (if any). When there is only one core member we include his /
her characteristics but in the case of couples we include information on both core members and
relate their characteristics to each other. We do this by first defining the person of interest in
the couple as that person with the highest value on the relevant independent variable, and then
capturing the difference between the two core members. So, for example, in the case of age,
we include the age (mainly in dummy form covering 10-year bands) of the eldest core member.
Additionally, we include a continuous variable capturing the difference in age between the eldest
core member and the other person in the couple.
In the case of education, we include the education level (in dummy form specifying basic or
college education) of the person with the highest level of education in the couple and we also
include a dummy variable indicating if the other member has a lower level of education. Finally,
in the case of labour market status, we include the status of that person with the highest income
as well as a dummy variable indicating if the other core member is employed. By defining the
characteristics of core couples in this way, we can assess the importance of differences among
core household members in a more parsimonious way than if we were to include a full set of
variables for each person. More importantly, this way of modelling is an attempt to focus on
the traits of the household as a group and their distribution without requiring the definition of
a “reference person” ex ante, all of whose characteristics would then be emphasized relative to
other members.
3.4 The second step: the impact of institutions on first step coefficients
In the second step of our analysis, we regress each of the estimated effects from the first
step covariates on each of the institutional variables of interest. The precise institutions that we
examine, along with the data sources, are shown in Table 3.1 while the actual data are provided
in Table 3.2. As discussed in the Introduction, we focus on those institutions that have tended to
be highlighted in the existing theoretical or empirical literature on household debt outcomes. It
should be noted that while we examine cross-country variation in the fraction of borrowers with
16Furthermore, we employ a location-scale model to take heteroscedasticity into account.
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debt, the amount of debt held and the interest rate payable on that debt, these variables are as
of 2009-2010. The institutions, however, are measured as of 2007. Arguably, we would need to
measure institutions at the time at which the “representative” mortgage was signed. We mitigate
this problem in two ways. Firstly, in discussing age profiles, we focus mainly on those age profiles
up to 55 years of age, as these groups will arguably have borrowed using secured debt originated
under current legislation. Secondly, to the extent that the institutions have been stable over
time, the problem of different time periods is lessened. During the process of compiling the
institution-level data, we noted that the presence of an institution (such as the existence of
tax deductibility of mortgage repayments) was a much more stable feature of legislation than
quantifications, in this case the exact measure of the amount of tax relief available). As such,
where possible we confirm the impact of each institution using both measures.
3.5 Age versus cohort effects
In the second stage of our analysis, we compare the differential response of different age
groups to cross country variation in institutions. Since the HFCS dataset includes only a cross
section of households from different countries, we are thus comparing responses across age cohorts
that may differ in other dimensions, such as lifetime resources. While we cannot fully solve for
this, we make three notes that make us relatively confident in the interpretation of a life-cycle
component. Firstly, as mentioned before, our discussions focus on groups below 54 years of
age and, in some instances, below 44 years of age. By limiting the age range, we examine
groups that are likely to have borrowed recently and that have had similar exposure to the
institutions that affect credit markets. Secondly, our baseline specification controls for income
and schooling, variables that correlate with cross-cohort variation in lifetime resources. Finally,
one way of separating cohort and life-cycle effects in our context would be to use country datasets
with many survey waves and different point-in-time measures of institutions. Regressing home
ownership on aggregate downpayment measures, Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) document that their
results do not quantitatively change when repeated surveys are used and are qualitatively similar
when country fixed effects are added.
3.6 Comparing interest rates across countries
We obtain insights about the distribution of the cost of debt across groups of the population
by examining how interest rates vary with the main covariates. While mortgage interest rates can
be safely interpreted as reflecting differences in the cost of debt that households face, interpreting
them as arising from different debt pricing is complicated by differential fixation modes across
countries in the Euro zone.17 Interest rates in FRMs reflect the risk that the household defaults,
the possibility of early cancellation to acquire a new mortgage when interest rates drop as well
as the lender’s expectations about the future path of interest rates. The interest rate of an
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) also reflects household default risks and a reference rate,
17The fraction of mortgages originated in 2007 as FRMs in AT, ES, GR, PT and SK was below 5%, according
to ECB (2009), while FRM originations exceeded 69% in FR, NL or BE. IT, LU and DE are intermediate cases.
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but not the expected path of future rates at the time of origination. Hence, interest rates in
different countries partly reflect not only differences in household default risk but also expected
macroeconomic factors at origination.
This version of the paper makes no attempt at isolating the various components of interest
rates for various reasons. Firstly, previous studies have obtained very limited success at parsing
the default and repayment risk components.18 Secondly, by including country specific intercepts
and slopes we control in a very flexible way for country-specific effects like the difference in
prevalence of FRMs. Within countries, there is no much heterogeneity as 8 out of 11 countries
are basically specialized in one type of mortgage. In that case, the second step regression of the
country-specific effects (intercepts and slopes) in the interest rate model on the share of FRMs
is informative about how much of the variation in FRMs accounts for variation in the cost of
borrowing.
4 First-stage results: the association between debt holdings and
household characteristics
4.1 Secured debt
The probability of holding debt
The results of the first specification, where the dependent variable is binary and captures people
who hold secured debt versus those who do not have secured debt, are shown in Figure 2 (and
Table 4). We present the probability for the reference group, the country-specific odds ratios and
the associated confidence intervals. The odds ratios should be interpreted relative to the omitted
category for each group (as detailed in Table 2). For example, in the case of the Netherlands,
the odds ratio for the “high education” variable is about 1.7. Since the omitted category here is
“medium education”, this implies that the odds of holding secured debt among households where
the reference person has a high level of education is about 1.7 times that of households where
the reference person has a medium level of education.
Firstly, the chart in the top left corner of Figure 2 shows the probability of holding debt
among the reference group specified earlier. This group displays markedly different probabilities
of holding secured debt across countries in the sample. The probability is highest for this type
of household in Spain, where the probability of holding secured debt is approximately 65 per
cent. The probability is lowest in Italy where this type of household has about a 10 per cent
probability of holding secured debt.
18Using survey data from the US, Campbell and Cocco (2003) make an attempt to isolate default and repayment
risks components by subtracting from the observed FRM interest rate the 10-year Treasury bond yield to maturity.
Similarly, they subtract the 1-year yield from the observed ARM rates, obtaining strikingly similar spreads in
FRM and ARMs. They end up assuming that the repayment risk component amounts to 100 bp in FRMs.
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In terms of the other charts in Figure 2, the first point of note is that the results are in keeping
with the existing literature on household debt; in general, the relationship between secured debt
holding and age displays a humped shape, where the likelihood of holding secured debt generally
increases up to the ages of 35 to 44 years and decreases thereafter. Higher income, higher levels of
education and employment are also associated with a greater likelihood of holding secured debt.
Finally, household size and composition matter; in several countries, the greater the number of
adults in a household, the higher are the chances that the household will hold secured debt.
Furthermore, households where the reference person is part of a couple tend to be associated
with a higher probability of holding secured debt.
The schooling profile is consistent with the basic life cycle model if one assumes that house-
holds with higher education are more likely to have higher future income. But these profiles
display significant heterogeneity across countries.
Turning to the country specific results, there are obvious differences in the effects of the
independent variables across countries. In the case of Austria, France, Germany or Portugal, for
example, a head of household who is aged between 16 and 34 years has a lower chance of holding
secured debt relative to 35 to 44 year olds (the omitted group); the odds ratio in these cases is
around 0.5. In the Netherlands or Slovakia, however, the profile is much flatter. The odds ratio
is higher than 1 in the latter case, suggesting that the odds of holding secured debt are greater
for households where the head is aged between 16 and 34 years relative to those aged between
35 and 44 years. The fraction of borrowers does not change much with household income in
the Netherlands and Slovakia but the income profile is much stronger in Germany, Spain, and
Luxembourg.
Moving next to the labour market status variables, the most obvious differences across coun-
tries are for the inactive/unemployed group. In general, the likelihood of holding secured debt
is lower for this group relative to the employed group. However, the extent of this varies widely
across countries. In Austria, Slovakia or Greece, the odds ratio for these groups is just below
1, whereas in Belgium, France, Germany or Luxembourg the odds ratio is less than 0.5. An-
other labour market variable that seems to matter to varying extents across countries is the
“other_core_working” variable. This dummy variable equals one if the core household member
with the lowest income is working, and zero otherwise. While this variable has a positive impact
across most countries, its effect ranges from a high of close to 2 (odds ratio) in Belgium to a low
of 0.9 in Spain.
Finally, we show the pseudo R-squared from our estimated regressions in the final chart in
Figure 2. It is clear that this value varies across the country level regressions. Interestingly, it
is relatively high in Belgium, at a value of close to 0.3. It is lowest in Greece, at just under 0.1,
suggesting that the current specification does not fit the data in Greece as well as it does for the
Belgian data.
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As a final step at this stage of the analysis, we explore an alternative empirical model that is
broadly in line with a life cycle model with human capital accumulation and credit constraints.
Such a model would predict that within the group of young households, those with higher ex-
pected income growth, i.e. those with a college education, would have a higher demand for
secured debt. In this case, the role of human capital should be less important for older house-
holds, since the higher income growth due to a college education is most likely to have already
materialized by age 50. Hence, as a test of an expanded life cycle model with credit constraints
and human capital, we re-run our previous Logit model of secured debt holding, but this time
we also include interactions between each age dummy and an indicator of "college education".
We constrain the interaction of college and age to be the same for groups aged more than 45. In
Table 7, we report the odds ratios for these interaction terms, along with the estimated standard
errors.
The results in the top row of Table 7 indeed suggest that, among young households, those
with a college degree have higher chances of borrowing secured; the odds ratio is above 1 in
eight out of the eleven countries. However, the odds ratios for older age groups are also above
1, contrary to the notion that the interactions between age and college degree capture higher
expected income growth early in the life cycle.
The amount of debt held
Next we model the quantity of outstanding secured debt as a function of the same socio-economic
and demographic variables used above. We employ two approaches at this stage. First we use
OLS regression techniques to assess the effect of the independent variables on the mean and
variance of the log of secured debt. Standard OLS provides the mean effects, while an additional
regression of the absolute value of OLS residuals on the same regressors provides the effects on
the variance of log secured debt. The model consisting of these two regression equations we call
location-scale model.
Second, to check if the effect of the covariates varies across the distribution of secured debt, we
use quantile regression techniques. The location-scale model allows for the effect of a covariate
to change monotonically across quantiles of secured debt. Quantile regressions allow for more
flexible distributional effects than the location-scale model. However, since in our case the
location-scale and quantile results are very similar, we only briefly comment on the quantile
regression results and instead report the full set of results in a web appendix.19
The country level results for the OLS regressions are presented in Figure 3 (and Table 5)
where we show the estimated coefficients and their confidence intervals, as well as the results
from the location-scale model that provides a test of heteroscedasticity. The omitted categories
for the dummy variables are as detailed previously in Table 2. The first chart on the top row of
Figure 3 reports the results for the reference group.
19Web appendix is available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/wie95bwb1pi90vb/web_appendix.pdf
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Across all countries, the amount of secured debt holdings is highest for households where the
reference person is aged 16 to 34 years. In almost all cases, households with heads older than 45
years tend to hold lower amounts of debt relative to the omitted group, 35 to 44 year olds.
Turning to the coefficients on the education variables, it is clear that higher education is
associated with higher debt levels relative to those with lower education levels. In Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands or Slovakia, high educated households hold at least 23% larger debt than
the reference group. The impact is smaller in Spain, Luxembourg, and Greece, in keeping with
the lower extensive margin response.
The cross-country differences in the income profile of the amount of secured debt held are
relatively similar to those corresponding to the fraction of borrowers. In particular, the amount
borrowed in France, Luxembourg, Germany, and Spain is more responsive to income than in the
Netherlands, Slovakia or Greece.
The coefficients on the labour market variables suggest that labour market status has an
important link with the level of outstanding debt. Relative to employees, in general the retired,
inactive and unemployed groups tend to have lower outstanding balances of secured debt while
the self-employed tend to have higher balances. Again, there is some variability in these effects
across countries, though the variability is not too large.
The coefficients on the household composition variables vary across countries. In most cases,
households where the reference person is part of a couple tend to hold lower balances of secured
debt relative to those where the reference person is not part of a couple, though the size of this
effect varies across the countries in our sample. Similarly, the number of adults in a household
impacts the level of outstanding debt to varying degrees across countries, though in general the
effect is negative.
Finally, we show the R-squared value for the estimated regressions in the final chart of Figure
4 (and Table 5). Similar to the first specification shown in Figure 2, we find that the value of
the R-squared varies quite a bit across countries. For this model, it ranges from a low of 0.11 for
Italy and Spain to a high of 0.32 for Luxembourg.
In terms of the quantile regression results, Figure 4 reports the estimated effects for each
of the countries in our sample. In general, the results do not deviate too much from the OLS
estimates presented above. In most cases, the estimates remain within the 95 per cent confidence
interval from the OLS regressions (not shown, but available in a web appendix).20 Moreover, we
find that most of the variation in the effect of household characteristics across the debt distri-
20 However, there are some exceptions. Notably, in a number of countries the age effects vary along the debt
distribution, and on occasion the estimates move outside the OLS 95 per cent confidence interval bounds. In the
case of Spain, for example, at the lower end of the distribution, the coefficient on the 16 to 34 year old dummy
variable is positive and close to 1.3, indicating that the level of outstanding debt tends to be higher among
households where the head is in this age group relative to households where the head is aged 35 to 44 years. At
the upper end of the debt distribution, however, this coefficient falls close to zero, suggesting almost no difference
between these two groups.
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bution is captured by the location scale model shown in Figure 3. Indeed, the most noticeably
straight upward or downward slopes observed in some quantile functions reflect a significant scale
parameter (indicated by the dark blue dots shown in Figure 3).
Cost of secured debt
The results on the impact of household characteristics on the cost of mortgage debt are shown
in Figure 5 (and Table 6). In most cases, variables capturing household composition, age, or
the education or work status of household members have only a limited impact on the interest
rate. There are a few exceptions. In Greece and Italy, for example, the results show that self-
employed people tend to pay higher interest rates, all else equal, than employees, while inactive
or unemployed people tend to pay lower rates. In France, interest rates are about 2 basis points
lower for households in the 16 to 34 year age group, relative to households in the 35 to 44 year age
group. French households in the 55 to 64 year age group, on the other hand, pay an interest rate
that is approximately 5 basis points higher than the reference group. In a number of countries
interest rates on secured debt fall with household income, but this income profile varies across
countries. In Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, the differences in interest rates are
similar across income groups. On the other side of the spectrum, the income profile of interest
rates is most noticeable in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. A move of two standard
deviations along the country specific income distribution decrease interest rates by 60 basis points
in Italy, 24 in Portugal, 140 in Luxembourg and 32 in Greece.
Finally, the interest rate payable by the reference group varies from a low of about 2.4 per
cent in Luxembourg, to a high of 4.6 per cent in Germany. The R-squared value also varies
across countries, from about 0.03 in Spain to 0.12 in Italy.21
4.2 Unsecured debt
The probability of holding debt
Turning to the results for unsecured debt, we present the country-specific odds ratios and the
associated confidence intervals in Figure 6. As with the results for secured debt, the odds ratios
should be interpreted relative to the omitted category for each.
21We have also examined how the covariates affect the probability of holding an ARM using country-specific
Logit model within the set of indebted households. In all countries of the sample, the odds of having an ARM
are unaffected by whether the household is below 35 years of age –a covariate we discuss in the second step.
Similarly, the education level of the member of a highest schooling level or the fact that the core member with
highest income is self-employed has virtually no impact on the choice between ARM and FRM. We do find some
variation in the impact of income on the choice of the ARM, being positive in ES or IT, and negative in PT or NL.
However, neither estimate is statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level. While the issue merits
further investigation, it does not seem likely that the age, income or self-employment profiles of debt outcomes
that we examine are influenced by endogenous choices of ARM vs FRM.
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The first chart shows the probability of holding unsecured debt among the reference group.
This varies quite a bit across countries. The probability of this group holding unsecured debt
is highest in Luxembourg, while it is lowest in Austria. Furthermore, in some countries the
probability of holding unsecured debt among the reference group is higher than for secured debt
(shown earlier in Figure 2); this applies in Germany, France, Italy and Slovakia.
Relative to the omitted categories, in general the results suggest that the chances of holding
unsecured debt fall once the household reference person moves beyond the 35 to 44 year age
group, once they achieve a high level of education and once they enter retirement. On the other
hand, the chances of holding unsecured debt increase as the number of adults in the household
rises. The impact of the other covariates varies across countries. For example, households where
the reference person is self-employed have a higher chance of holding unsecured debt, relative
to households where the reference person is employed, in Italy, the Netherlands and Slovakia.
In the remaining countries, this group has the same or lower chances of holding unsecured
debt. Similarly, the impact of income varies quite a bit across countries. In Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Slovakia, below average income lowers the odds of holding unsecured debt,
albeit only mildly, while in most other countries it increases or has a limited effect on these odds.
Comparing the results from Figure 6 to the corresponding results for secured debt shown
earlier (Figure 2), the most obvious differences in the impact of the covariates appears to be for
the youngest age cohort (aged 16 to 34), the high education group and income. In the case of
secured debt, households in the 16-34 year age group had a much lower chance of holding debt
relative to the 35 to 44 year olds; in the case of unsecured debt, this group has a similar or, in
some cases a higher, chance of holding debt. Furthermore, in the case of secured debt, a high
level of education is associated with a higher chance of holding debt relative to a medium level
of education. In contrast, for unsecured debt this group has a lower relative chance of holding
debt. Finally, higher income substantially increases the chances of holding secured debt in most
countries, while in the case of unsecured debt, in many countries above median income has a
limited impact on the chances of holding debt.
A possible interpretation of these results is that secured debt is a derived demand of housing
showing a strong income profile while the probability of holding unsecured debt has weaker
income or schooling profiles. The results in Arrondel et al. (2013) and Teppa et al. (2013) point
in the same direction, the former showing the demand for real assets strongly growing with income
while the later finds a counterbalancing negative effect of income in the case of consumption
debt. In contrast, the probability of holding unsecured debt varies with the number of adults
in the household, likely tied to other types of consumption. Such weak response is possibly the
outcome of the opposing effects of the household’s desire to smooth consumption – that leads to
a negative link between current income and debt holding- and the bank’s active policy to screen
out consumers with a low ability to pay – generating the opposite effect.
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The amount of debt held
Next we model the quantity of outstanding unsecured debt as a function of the socio-economic
and demographic variables. We follow the same approach as for secured debt, first using OLS
methods to model the effect of the independent variables on the log of unsecured debt, then using
quantile regression techniques to check if the effect of the covariates varies across the distribution
of unsecured debt. The country level results for the OLS regressions are presented in Figure 7
where we show the estimated coefficients, their confidence intervals and the results from the
location-scale model that accounts for heteroscedasticity.
The first chart shows the average balance of (log) unsecured debt held by the reference group
across countries. Similar to the case of secured debt, the constant term varies across countries;
it ranges from a low of 6.97 in Slovakia to a high of 9.35 in the Netherlands.
From Figure 7, it is clear that the effect of the covariates on the amount of unsecured debt held
varies substantially across countries. In some countries, for example, the relationship between
age and debt amounts exhibits an almost inverted U-shape, where the amount of unsecured debt
held increases up to ages 35 to 44 years, and falls thereafter. This pattern can be observed in
Austria. In other countries, there is very little variability in debt holdings across age groups –
France, Italy and Luxembourg, for example. In other countries still, the relationship between
age and debt amounts is more erratic, sometimes decreasing up to age 35 to 44, increasing for
ages 45 to 54 and then falling off again (e.g. the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia).
In terms of the impact of education on the quantity of unsecured debt held, again this impact
varies across countries. In a number of countries, the education level of the household reference
person does not have much impact on the quantity of debt held – this applies in Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain and Luxembourg. Similarly, in most of these countries the difference in education
variable does not appear to have much impact on the quantity of debt held. However, in some
other countries the education level appears to be quite important. In Portugal and Slovakia,
for example, households where the reference person has a low level of education tend to hold
higher levels of unsecured debt than households where the reference person has a medium level
of education. However, the amount of debt held by households with a high level of education in
these countries is also higher than the medium education households. The difference in education
variable also appears to be quite important in the Netherlands and Slovakia, indicating that
varying education levels amongst core household members matters for the quantity of debt held.
The coefficients on the labour market variables suggest that labour market status is an im-
portant determinant of the level of outstanding unsecured debt in all countries. Furthermore,
in many countries the impact of these variables on the level of debt is similar to the case of
secured debt; in general the results suggest that, relative to employees, the self-employed tend
to hold larger amounts of debt, while in many countries the retired, inactive and unemployed
groups tend to hold lower or similar amounts. In cases where the other core household member
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is working, this tends to have a positive, albeit small, impact on the amount of unsecured debt
held.
In terms of the effect of household composition on the quantity of debt held, the relevant
variables tend to have a small positive effect on debt amounts in the majority of countries. In
most cases, for example, households where the reference person is part of a couple tend to hold
higher balances of unsecured debt relative to those where the reference person is not part of a
couple. Finally, the coefficient on the income variable shows that higher income is associated
with higher outstanding unsecured debt levels, a result that is in keeping with the earlier results
for secured debt.
We also use quantile regression techniques to check if the effects of the covariates on the
amount of unsecured debt vary across the debt distribution. In the majority of countries the
results, (which are available in Figure 8 and for each country separately in a web appendix),
show almost no difference between the estimates from the quantile regressions and those from the
OLS regressions presented above. In most countries, the estimates from the quantile regressions
remain within the 95 per cent confidence interval from the OLS regressions.
4.3 Summary
In summary, the results thus far suggest that socio-economic and demographic factors are im-
portant determinants of debt holdings, though the precise impact of these variables differs across
countries. As a simple illustration of this fact, in Figure 9 we plot a selection of predicted
probabilities of holding secured debt, by country, for key covariates in our regressions.
The chart shows three patterns. Firstly, cross-country differences in the fraction of borrowers
with secured debt are most noticeable when we compare the reference groups. Secondly, the
strong age-cohort effects in Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg or Portugal contrast with much flatter
profiles in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands or Slovakia. Finally, while the fraction of borrowers
increases rather slowly with current income in the Netherlands or Slovakia, the schooling profile
of lending is relatively strong in these countries. On the other hand, the strong income profile
of borrowing in Luxembourg, or Spain contrasts with their weak schooling profile. A possible
interpretation, if one takes schooling as a proxy for permanent income, is that banks in different
countries value the household’s earnings capacity in different horizons. The second step of the
analysis examines the role of country level institutions in driving these differences.
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5 Second stage results: the influence of institutions and credit
conditions
5.1 The effect of institutions
The previous charts highlight the varying impacts of the socio-economic and demographic factors
in explaining household debt behaviour across euro area countries. In this section, we examine
the role of institutions and credit conditions in driving the heterogeneity in these patterns. To
do this, we regress each of the estimated effects from the first step covariates on each of the
institutional variables of interest. Details of the institutions we use may be found in Tables 3.1
and 3.2.
In keeping with the presentation of the first stage results, we present the results of this stage
in graphical form where we group the charts into three columns. In all of the figures that follow,
the first column of charts shows the impact of the institutional variables on the odds of holding
debt (the dependent variables correspond to the estimated coefficients shown in Figure 2 from
the first step). The second column of charts reports the effect of institutions on the amount
of debt held (the dependent variables are the estimated OLS coefficients from the first step).
The third and final column of charts reports the effect of institutions on the interest rate on the
household’s primary mortgage. The charts show the point estimates from the regressions, and
the 95 per cent confidence intervals associated with these estimates. At this stage we present
only a selection of the results, focussing mainly on those coefficients from the first step that are
particularly interesting from a theoretical or empirical perspective22.
Duration of foreclosure
Factors that increase the incidence and cost of lender’s asset recovery process in the event of non-
payment have an important impact on household debt holdings. Duration of repossession and
bankruptcy are similar institutions in that respect. Chatterjee et al (2007), Livshits et al (2007)
and Hintermeier and Koeniger (2011), for example, simulate the general equilibrium behaviour
of US consumers in a world with bankruptcy and in another in which no such option is available.
Their results suggest that lenders react to the increase in uncertainty in repayment in a world
where bankruptcy is allowed by charging group-specific interest rates to unsecured loans. Due
to their limited ability to save, the youth should be a riskier subpopulation, so lenders price this
risk in by charging higher interest rates to this group.
We focus on the time required to foreclose on secured debt and the typical cost of foreclosure.
In terms of the expected impact of these institutions on our results, it is important to bear in
mind that the existing literature (mentioned above) focuses on unsecured debt holding, rather
22One of the aims in this study is to establish which institutions matter most at explaining the distribution of
debt outcomes. As part of such assessment, and given the number of countries available to conduct the exercise,
we also investigate if an imprecisely estimated coefficient may still imply an interesting economic impact.
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than secured debt. Our implicit assumption to take these predictions to the data is that long
times to repossess make secured debt look like unsecured debt.
The results are presented in Figure 10 where we show the output from regressions of the
first step coefficients on the typical duration of foreclosure (measured in months). In countries
where the repossession process takes longer, the reference group is less likely to hold secured debt
relative to countries with shorter repossession times. The first chart in Figure 10, for example,
shows that a one-month delay in the time to repossess leads to a 0.7 percentage point reduction
in the chances of holding secured debt, and this result is statistically significant at the 95 per cent
confidence level. In terms of the amount of debt held, an increase in the duration of foreclosure
tends to lead to a modest reduction in debt amounts held by the reference group.
Conditional on borrowing, the results show that the youngest households borrow lower amounts
than the reference group in countries where the repossession period is longer; in countries where
the repossession period is longer by a month, the youngest age group borrows 0.8 percentage
points less than the reference group. On the other hand, the amounts borrowed by other age
groups, up to age 64, tend to be unaffected by the repossession time (relative to the reference
group). The most pronnounced drop in the amount of debt held by the 16-34 age group –
conditional on borrowing- is consistent with simulations in Livshits et al’s (2007), who show
that bankruptcy diminishes most the –unconditional- amount borrowed by households around
30 years of age.
Intuitively, one would expect that when repossession costs are higher, banks restrict their
borrowing to “safe”, high income households. There is some evidence of this effect in the results;
a one month longer repossession period increases the relative chances of holding debt among
high income households, albeit the result is not significant. At the same time, a one month
longer repossession period is associated with a relatively lower interest rate among high income
households (when the difference between high and low income households is measured by the
coefficient of log income). A possible interpretation of this result is that in situations when the
losses in the event of non-repayment are larger, banks react by charging relatively higher interest
rates to riskier (low income) households. The latter effect is precisely estimated23.
It is worth noting that the three patterns we have highlighted in the text are also noticeable
in the scatterplots in Figure 10a, 10b and 10c. The chart in the first column displays the
negative relation between the fraction of secured debt holders in the reference group and time
to repossess. The chart in the second column of Figure 10b shows the negative relation between
time to repossess and the amount of debt held by the youth while its negative link with interest
23There is some evidence in the existing literature that supports the interpretation of the variation in the effect
of the time to repossess as reflecting a better willingness of banks to lend to households with higher income growth
–or alleviating credit constraints. For example, Gerardi et al (2010) argue that lifting credit constraints permits
high income growth households to access the credit market. The schooling profile of debt holding gives some
insights about the issue, since the absence of credit constraints should reinforce the role of permanent income
in explaining the distribution of borrowers. The results in Table 8 support this interpretation: regardless of the
measure of repossession costs (in terms of time or money), higher costs reduce the chances of holding debt by
college educated households the most.
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rates for high income households is shown in the last chart of Figure 10c. For example, the long
repossession periods in Italy, Greece and Portugal result in a steep income profile of interest
rates charged to households, while the short repossession periods in the Netherlands, Austria,
Germany or Spain result in comparatively modest interest rate-income profiles.
Taxation of mortgage payments
We employ two measures of institutions relating to mortgage related taxation exemptions; firstly
we examine cases where a tax deduction on mortgage interest payments exists. We generate a
dummy variable which equals one if such an exemption exists, and zero otherwise. Only two
countries do not have such an exemption – Germany and Slovakia. Secondly, for those countries
where an exemption exists, we generate a dummy variable which equals one if there is no limit
on the amount of interest payments subject to deductibility, and zero if a limit exists. We then
regress the first step coefficients on both dummy variables in a bivariate regression. The results
for the indicator of “exemption exists” are presented in Figure 11.1. In Figure 11.2 we present
the results for the indicator “no limit exists”.
Gervais (2002) predicts that the introduction of a (partial) tax exemption on mortgage interest
rate payments increases housing consumption and home ownership over the life cycle. Further-
more, compared to a situation where such incentives are not present, the increase in housing
consumption happens through an anticipation of housing purchases over the life cycle.
The results shown in Figures 11.1 and 11.2 are broadly in line with the predictions of Gervais
(2002), though in many cases, the estimates are not very precise. The results suggest that interest
payment tax deductibility increases the chances that the reference household will hold secured
debt by 17 percentage points, a large but imprecisely estimated coefficient (first chart, row 1,
Figure 11.1). Turning to the amount of debt held by the reference group, the existence of interest
payment deductibility increases the amount of debt held by a considerable 34% (=exp(.29)-1),
but the effect is imprecise. Finally, the reference group pays a lower interest rate on secured debt
in those countries where a tax exemption for mortgage repayments exists. If there is no limit on
the amount of deductibility, this does not impact much the chances that the reference group will
hold secured debt, but it increases substantially the amount of debt held ?again, the estimate is
imprecise.
The charts in the second row of Figures 11.1 and 11.2 suggest an age profile in the probability
of holding secured debt in countries with tax relief for mortgage interest payments. Older house-
holds are less likely to hold secured debt, relative to the reference group. Furthermore, some age
profiles can also be detected in the response of the debt amount, where the youngest group of
households tends to hold more debt than the reference households, while older households tend
to hold less.
The fourth row of charts in Figures 11.1 and 11.2 focuses on the income coefficients from
the first step. Interestingly, there is no evidence of an income profile in the results. This is
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contrary to Gervais’ predictions as any tax incentive would reinforce the role of higher marginal
taxes. A possible explanation of the similarity of income profiles on the chances of holding debt
across countries with and without limits on tax deductions is that high income households pay
relatively higher interest rates in countries without a limit on mortgage tax deductions. This
finding could be due to indirect mechanisms – it’s possible, for example, that rich households use
the exemption to increase their leverage and banks may thus wish to limit the supply of loans
to high income groups. Nevertheless, the differences in the estimated income profile of interest
rates are imprecise.
To obtain additional sources of variability in the measure of tax treatment of secured borrow-
ing, we examine an indicator generated by Johansson (forthcoming), who estimates the difference
between the pre- and after-tax interest rate on mortgages; the results are available in a web ap-
pendix.24 When we employ this measure as our taxation institution, we find a positive association
between interest tax relief and the chances that the reference group holds debt. In addition, the
tax relief measure correlates with higher amounts of secured debt holdings by the reference group.
Finally, there is tentative evidence of a pass-through of the tax relief into higher interest rates
paid by households. On the other hand, the basic prediction of an age profile is not fully con-
firmed by the new measure. Furthermore, when we employ this measure, we no longer observe
the youngest households having a higher probability of holding secured debt in countries with
a more generous mortgage tax relief. Nevertheless, we still find that among young households
with secured debt, the amount of debt held is largest in countries with generous mortgage tax
deductions -?both effects are relative to the reference group25.
Financial regulation
Next we examine the role of institutions relating to financial regulation, focussing specifically
on regulatory loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. From a theoretical perspective, the models of Ortalo-
Magné and Rady (OM-R) (1999, 2006) provide some predictions about the impact of LTV
ratios on homeownership and secured debt holdings. In their model, a relaxation of the LTV
ratio increases secured debt holding by individuals with a lower ability to save, the young,
and especially those with lower income levels. Furthermore, the increased demand for first-
time purchases by the credit-constrained young must be met by the property sales of older
agents. Although OM-R do not discuss the issue, the house sales would presumably lead to debt
repayments by the elderly. Hence, the relaxation of the LTV increases the fraction of borrowers
among the youth and could diminish borrowing among the elderly, thereby generating an age
profile of debt holding. Even though the OM-R model does not aim to model the distribution of
24Johansson compiled data on the following variables in OECD countries: the average marginal income tax,
the interest rate, the country specific tax treatment of mortgage payments, whether the tax relief is on housing,
as well as information on whether tax exemptions exist. Making further assumptions about the relationship
between house prices and mean income in the country, she is able to discount the stream of tax deductions into
a continuous measure of each country’s “tax relief” for mortgage payments.
25 Nevertheless, the measure by Johansson includes country-specific interest rates, among other components.
The inclusion of interest rates as explanatory variables is at odds with our current strategy of examining whether
institutions affect debt amounts and prices separately
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the amount of secured debt held, in their setup, a relaxation of the LTV ratio would mechanically
lead to higher debt amounts among the youth.
Conversely, the simulations by Chambers et al. (2009) argue that general equilibrium effects
on the interest rate may dampen the impacts previously mentioned – these effects are ignored in
the OM-R models, where the authors assume that interest rates are constant and exogenously
determined.
We run a regression on two variables at this stage; the first variable is the existence of a
regulatory LTV limit. Among the sample of countries, such a limit exists in all but four countries
– Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Second, for those countries that have
a regulatory LTV limit, we examine if the level of that limit helps to explain the variation in
the effects of the socio-economic and demographic variables from the first stage regressions. The
respective results are shown in Figures 12.1 and 12.2.
The top row of charts in Figure 12.1 focuses on the reference group. The results suggest that
the existence of a regulatory LTV limit reduces slightly the chances of holding debt, though this
impact is not very precisely estimated (the first chart in row 1). On the other hand, the existence
of a regulatory LTV reduces the amount of debt held by the reference group (middle chart in
row 1). Specifically, the average debt held by the reference group in a country with a maximum
LTV limit is 67 per cent lower than in a country with no maximum LTV limit.
Turning to the same group of charts in Figure 12.2, here we assess the impact of the level of
the LTV limit for those countries in which it exists. The charts show that an increase in the
regulatory LTV limit (which implies a decrease in the amount of down-payment required by the
customer), has a negligible impact on the chances of holding secured debt or the amount of debt
held by the reference group.
The charts in the second row of Figure 12.1 highlight the impact of LTV limits in explaining
the variation in the step 1 age effects. In contrast to the theoretical predictions of OM-R, there
is limited evidence that a maximum LTV limit affects the age profile of debt holding. However,
there is some evidence of an impact on the age profile when considering the amount of debt.
Specifically, the middle chart on row 2 shows that a limit on the LTV ratio reduces the amount
of debt held among the youngest households in the sample.
Focussing on the same group of charts in Figure 12.2, we see that in those countries in which
an LTV limit exists, an increase in this limit raises the chances of holding debt for the youngest
age cohorts, while it has a negative impact for older age groups. This finding is in keeping with
the basic prediction of the OM-R model.26 In terms of the amount of debt held (middle chart),
26Further evidence that LTVs can cause credit constraints is available from the schooling profile of debt holding.
In countries where there is no regulatory limit on LTV ratios, college educated households are more likely to
borrow. This pattern is consistent with the prediction by Gerardi et al (2010) mentioned above; in countries with
lower credit constraints, indicators of high income growth (a college degree, for example) are good predictors of
the chances of borrowing. However, the pattern is not present when we examine the effects of increases in the
maximum LTV ratio.
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higher LTVs do not appear to have a noticeable impact among the younger age cohorts. On the
other hand, they appear to be associated with an increase in debt amounts for the older age
groups.
We also focus on the role of a regulatory LTV limit on the varying income coefficients from
the first stage regressions. As already discussed, theory suggests that maximum LTV ratios,
and changes to these, should have an important effect on the role of income in explaining debt
holdings. We would expect, for example, that the introduction of a maximum LTV ratio, or
reductions in the ratio if it already exists, would exert downward pressure on the chances of
holding debt among low income groups if credit constraints are binding, while the effects should
not be as pronounced for higher income groups, who should be able to better afford the larger
down payment. However, the results (shown in the fourth row of Figures 12.1 and 12.2) do not
fully support this. There is no evidence, for example, that the LTV limit impacts the chances of
holding secured debt in a statistically significant way. Furthermore, the existence of a limit does
not appear to have much impact on the quantity of debt held. On the other hand, we do find
some effect from the level of the LTV limit in explaining the income profile of the debt amount
from the first step. The results (fourth row, Figure 12.2) suggest that low income households
expand their borrowing the most when the maximum LTV ratio increases. The OM-R model
does not have a prediction regarding this effect.
Finally, there is not much evidence that either the existence of a regulatory maximum LTV
limit, or increases in this limit, result in higher interest rates being charged to the reference
group – in that sense, the channel stressed by Chambers et al (2009) does not seem to operate.
Furthermore, among those countries with a maximum LTV ratio, a 10 per cent higher ratio is
associated with a drop, not an increase, in the interest rate charged to the reference group of 24
basis points, a quantitatively large, but imprecisely estimated effect. In summary, there is little
cross-country evidence that less strict regulatory LTV ratios result in higher cost mortgages27.
Fixed interest rates
Campbell and Cocco (2003) solve a dynamic life-cycle model of the optimal consumption and
mortgage choice. In principle, borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages are exposed to income
risks. These risks can be particularly large when interest rates are high and borrower income is
relatively low. They show that borrowers who are risk averse or who have uncertain income may
find fixed rate mortgages to be a more attractive mortgage choice.
In the context of the current study, the main empirically testable condition of the Campbell
and Cocco model is that in countries where fixed rate mortgages are more prevalent, the house-
holds most exposed to income risk would have a higher chance of borrowing. To test this, the
27The age profile of interest rates does not support the hypothesis that variation across countries in regulatory
LTV ratios results in higher interest rates paid by indebted young households: in countries with a maximum LTV
(all but AT, BE, LU and NL) indebted young households actually pay 32 basis points higher interest rates on
their main mortgage than comparable young adults in other countries.
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independent variable in our model is a dummy variable indicating if the proportion of mortgages
on fixed interest rates for a period of longer than ten years is over 50 per cent.28 For the depen-
dent variable, we use the self-employment status of the reference person, taking this as a proxy
for income risk. As a tentative check, we also examine the age, education level and income of
the reference person, on the basis that low education or age could imply a higher exposure to
unemployment risk. The results are presented in Figure 13.
The first row of charts shows that the propensity to hold secured debt within the reference
group is not much affected by the prevalence of fixed-interest rate mortgages. If anything, the
reference group holds a higher amount of (log) debt in countries where the share of FRMs is
above 50 per cent: conditional on borrowing, the amount of debt held by the reference group is
16 percentage points larger.
The third chart in the first row of Figure 13 shows that when comparing countries where
FRMs account for over 50 per cent of the mortgage stock and those countries where FRMs
account for a lower proportion the interest rate for the reference group is 73 basis points higher
in the first set, with a standard error of about 30 basis points. Campbell and Cocco (2003)
argue that, unconditionally, FRMs involve a higher interest rate than ARMs because of the term
premia and because, in the United States, credit suppliers may price the borrower’s option to
repay in full if interest rates fall29. All these effects would lead to a greater prevalence of FRMs
being associated to higher interest rates.
Next we examine the results for the age profiles. Aside from possibly being credit constrained,
young households are arguably more exposed to income risk than older households, and so
we would expect to see younger households with a higher probability of holding secured debt
in countries with more FRMs. However, this is not the case. Rather, we observe younger
households who are less likely to hold secured debt in countries where FRMs are more prevalent,
and older households (the 45-54 and the 55-64 groups) who are relatively more likely to borrow
in these countries. Campbell and Cocco argue that variable rate mortgages are less attractive
for households who hold a large mortgage (for example the youth, as they cannot afford a large
down payment). From that perspective, the age profile appears to be somewhat surprising. On
the other hand, it could be that supply side effects are at play whereby banks in FRM countries
charge higher interest rates to the youth, thereby discouraging demand for secured debt among
that group. Indeed, the results in the third column support this hypothesis; we see that holding
the rest of characteristics constant at those of the reference group, and taking into account the
impact of prevalence of FRM on the reference group the youngest households pay overall higher
rates in countries where FRMs are more prevalent. The results show that in countries where the
28 We also used the actual share of mortgages with maturity over 30 years (as of 2007) as an independent
variable and obtained similar results.
29In our case, most surveys were conducted in 2010, when 1-year or sixth-months interest rates were very low.
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prevalence of FRMs exceeds 50% the interest rate paid by the group of households between 16
and 34 years of age is 48 basis points higher.30
The third row of charts shows the impact of the prevalence of FRMs on the education profile.
Interestingly, low education households are less likely to hold secured debt in countries with a
greater proportion of FRMs, and this result is statistically significant. Similar to the case of the
age profile, this finding is again inconsistent with Campbell and Cocco’s basic proposition that
increased unemployment risk (in this instance, among low-education households) can increase
the chances of holding fixed rate debt contracts31.
The charts in the final row focus on the self-employed profile. A greater prevalence of FRMs
is associated with a 27.6 percentage point greater likelihood of holding secured debt relative to
the reference group, a result that is in line with the predictions of Campbell and Cocco (2003).
Furthermore, in these countries, the self-employed hold somewhat higher debt levels relative to
countries with less prevalence of FRMs, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. On the
other hand, however, the cross-country variation in FRM proportions does not seem to impact
the interest rates charged to the self-employed. The higher demand for secured debt among the
self-employed is not directly translated into higher interest rates.
Finally, the discussion about the relevance of FRMs raises a cautionary note. On the one hand,
there is substantial variation in the share of FRMs across countries, and as we have shown, this
variation will mechanically change interest rates. However, such a change may be correlated
with that of other institutions. It is also worth noting that changes in the prevalence of FRMs
do not substantially alter the income or self-employment profiles of interest rates. At any rate,
the discussion highlights the need to control for several institutions at a time, which we discuss
later.
Conditions that reduce initial debt repayments
The basic permanent income model predicts that conditions that reduce initial mortgage repay-
ments allow credit constrained households to expand their housing consumption by borrowing
relatively more (see Attanasio et al, 2008 for an application to the demand for loans to purchase
cars). Conversely, households with perfect access to credit markets should not respond to such
an incentive since, for them the timing of payments is less important. In their study of homeown-
ership in the US, Chambers et al (2009) calibrate an OLG model and find evidence in support
of this hypothesis. They find that the introduction of mortgage products that reduce the initial
repayments, like interest only mortgages, increase home ownership among young and low income
groups, as credit constraints are most relevant for those groups.
30This is computed as follows: (.739-.281). The other features of the age profile of interest rates and secured
debt holding are harder to interpret. A higher prevalence of FRMs results in the 45-64 year group paying higher
interest rates on their secured debt but they also have a relatively higher take-up of secured debt loans.
31Of course, it could be the case that the education profile is not fully capturing income risk. As such, the result
could be verified with reference to other variables such as whether or not the household member has a fixed-term
contract.
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Motivated by Chambers et al (2009), we consider an indicator measuring whether the propor-
tion of mortgages with interest only payments for the first three years of the mortgage exceeds
10 per cent (in 2007). The results, which are presented in Figure 14, show that the chances
of holding secured debt increase for the reference group as the proportion of loans on interest
only arrangements rises. The impacts are imprecise but are roughly of the same magnitude as
the effects of LTVs or time to foreclosure shown earlier.32. We find little or no evidence of an
age profile in the results although, by definition institutions that reduce initial repayments lead
to higher debt levels later in life, thereby making it difficult to detect true age profiles in the
results.33
The final row of chart 14 focuses on the impact on the income coefficients from the first step
regressions. The results show that interest only repayments decrease the income effect when
considering the amount of debt held –although the estimate is not very precise. This suggests
a relatively larger response of debt holdings among low income households relative to higher
income households. Such a finding is consistent with the notion that low income households are
credit constrained and profit the most from lower initial mortgage payments.
Information on borrowers
Edelberg (2006) argues that better information allows banks to discriminate among borrowers
and, possibly, to price in, at higher interest rates, consumers that may otherwise have their
credit applications rejected.34 Without information on borrowers, banks may use “one size fits
all” mortgages, whereby they reject the petitions of riskier profiles. With improved information,
banks develop better scoring mechanisms, so that riskier profiles can now be observed borrowing,
paying above-average interest rates.
In this case, to the extent that age, self-employment and income are correlated with the risk of
loan arrears, one might expect an age or income profile when considering the impact of borrower
information on the chances of holding debt. It is less clear how borrower information might
impact the amount of debt held once a borrower’s credit application has been accepted. On the
32We have investigated the impact of the prevalence of interest only mortgages on debt outcomes using a
specification that has the share of interest-only mortgages as an independent variable as opposed to the 10%
indicator. Multiplying 15 per cent by the impact of the share of interest-only mortgages on the probability of
holding debt of the reference group (.009) results in 13.5 percentage points. That magnitude is lower than the
17 percentage point impact of the existence of a mortgage deduction, and similar to the precisely estimated 14
percentage point impact of 20 months shorter time to foreclose. Furthermore, a 10 percentage point increase in
the share of interest only mortgages increases the debt amount held by 34 percentage points, while the existence
of an LTV limit diminishes debt holding by 67 percentage points, and the absence of a limit to mortgage tax
deduction increases debt by 54 percentage points.
33In a web appendix, we experiment with alternative institutions, like the spread of long mortgage maturities or
of mortgages that permit borrowers to extend the maturity. The results are similar: the availability of products
that permit either “suspending payments” or “extending maturities” does not increase the chances that the refer-
ence group holds secure debt. In addition, higher shares of “mortgages that allow for maturity extensions” result in
a lower share of high-income or high-education households in the pool of borrowers. Part of the explanation could
come from the fact that the spread of those products is associated with higher interest rates for that reference
group. For example, in countries where more than 30 per cent of mortgages allow for maturity extension, interest
rates are 53 basis points higher for the reference group.
34See Magri and Pico (2010) for an application of Edelberg’s methods to Italy.
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one hand amounts borrowed by riskier profiles may increase because of improved information on
borrowers. On the other hand, however, the higher interest rate which these risky borrowers face
could discourage borrowing, reducing the amount borrowed.
To account for borrower information, we employ a six-point “depth of credit information index”
from the World Bank. The results are shown in Figure 15 and 16 for secured and unsecured
debt, respectively. The first chart in row 1 shows the impact of information on the chances that
the reference group will hold secured debt. A one-point increase in the information scale (an
improvement in knowledge) reduces the probability of having secured debt by 7 per cent for this
group, while the corresponding reduction for unsecured debt is 3.5 percentage points. However,
the middle chart shows that once borrowers hold a debt product (whether secured or unsecured),
the amount borrowed increases with improved knowledge.
The third column shows the impact of borrower information on the various profiles for interest
rates. The results support the hypothesis that improved borrower-level information is associated
with a better pricing of the loans for young households if, for example, such households would
have their credit application rejected in the absence of information. The chart suggests that a
1 point increase in the depth of information raises interest rates charged to young households
by 4 basis points and lowers those charged to 45-54 year olds and 55-64 year olds by 17 and 31
basis points, respectively –all estimates relative to the impact on the reference group. The age
profiles of secured debt holding and the amount of debt held are shown in the second row of
Figure 15. Interestingly, the knowledge variable has a statistically significant effect on the age
profile; as the age of the reference person increases, better information about borrowers has a
less negative effect on the chances of holding debt and, it has a stronger positive effect on the
amounts of secured debt held. We do not find that depth of information affects the age profile of
the probability or amount of unsecured borrowing (Figure 16). Unfortunately, the information
about interest rates for unsecured debt is not very reliable due to large fraction of missing values
in some countries, so we cannot investigate further.
We show the self-employed profile on the fourth row of Figure 15. The results are in keeping
with those for the age profile; specifically, we see that “riskier” borrowers pay higher interest
rates in countries where the level of borrower information is better. The interest rate charged on
mortgages for households where the reference person is self-employed is 20 basis points higher in
countries with (one point) better information.
Finally, the income profile is shown in the third row of Figure 15. Contrary to the expectation
that improvements in borrower information might lessen the importance of current income in
accessing credit, the results show a negligible impact of information on the chances of holding
secured debt. Furthermore, the results suggest that more information on borrowers does not
alter the mortgage interest rates charged to high income households – those borrowers who,
in principle, are less likely to have problems repaying their debt. Finally, deeper information
increases the relative amount of unsecured debt held by low income households. Overall, the
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evidence with income profiles is less supportive of the predictions tested by Edelberg than the
results of the age or self-employment profiles.
Financial literacy
Finally, we examine the role of cross-country differences in financial literacy in explaining the
impacts of the covariates from the first step. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) show that financially
illiterate households are more likely to engage in costly transactions and to underestimate the
impact of interest rates on debt amounts. At face value, such behavior should result in a neg-
ative correlation between financial literacy and unsecured debt holdings. On the other hand,
using Swiss household data, Brown and Graf (2013) documents that higher financial literacy is
correlated with higher chances of having a mortgage.
We use a measure of financial literacy from the World Competitiveness Yearbook as reported
in Figure 1 of Jappelli (2010). A one-point increase in financial literacy (in a scale from 1 to 10)
increases the probability of holding either secured or unsecured debt within the reference group
only by about 1 to 2 percentage points, a small and imprecisely estimated effect (see Figures 17
and 18). Conditional on holding each type of debt, an increase of 1 point of financial literacy
results in an 18 per cent increase in the amount of secured debt held and a 23 per cent increase in
the amount of unsecured debt. Albeit not very precise, these results suggest that, if anything, the
amount of debt held by the reference group is higher in countries with higher financial literacy.
Interestingly, a higher level of financial literacy strongly reinforces the role of schooling in
the probability of holding secured debt, a finding we discuss below. Higher financial literacy
increases the relative chances of households aged 45-54, relative to 35-44 year-old households,
having either secured or unsecured debt holdings. Nevertheless, the youngest set of households
seems to increase their relative chances of holding unsecured debt in more financially literate
countries, but these results are not precise. One interpretation of this set of results is that higher
levels of financial literacy result in greater chances of borrowing among relatively less vulnerable
households, defined as those with a college degree whose age is closest to the peak of the income
profile35.
Overall, we place less confidence in our results of financial literacy than in the rest of the
institutional measures. Firstly, the measure varies at the country level, but there is substantial
heterogeneity in financial literacy across the population. Secondly, financial literacy is likely
to be affected by past experiences in the debt market, so it is hard to assess the direction of
causality.
35When we use a measure of literacy based on PISA match scores the result on the steeper schooling profile is
unchanged, but the age profile is no longer significant.
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5.2 The effects of institutions: controlling for the share of fixed rate mort-
gages.
The previous analysis examined the impact of one institution at a time on the various debt
outcomes. A summary table of these results may be found in Table 8. This “univariate” analysis
is a necessary first step mainly because of the limited number of countries analyzed, but also
because the theoretical papers that acted as an informal guide also isolate the contribution of
each institution separately. It would nevertheless be desirable to hold at least some specific
institutions constant when analyzing the impact of others.
An institution that varies markedly across Euro area countries is the prevalence of FRMs that,
as we reported, alters the interest rate charged to the reference household. Such difference in the
cost of debt may confound the impact of other institutions on the fraction of households that
borrow. Furthermore, to understand which institutions are most successful at explaining the
variation in the derivative effects documented, we need to assess the relative explanatory power
of one institution against another reasonable alternative. We start our robustness exercise by
adding the share of FRM as an additional regressor in each second step regression in the present
Subsection -the results are summarized in Appendix Table A.4. and conduct a fully multivariate
analysis in Section 5.3.
The quantitative impacts of longer repossession periods on age and income profiles do not
noticeably change when the share of FRM is included as an additional control in the second step.
Longer repossession periods diminish the fraction of borrowers within the reference group, result
in lower debt amounts held by younger households ?with the rest of covariates of the reference
group- and increase the income gradient of mortgage interest rates. Regarding tax treatment
of mortgages, once we compare countries with similar prevalence of FRMs we still find that the
absence of a limit to mortgage payment exemptions increases the amount of debt held by the
reference group –the rest of the impacts were imprecise to start with.
Similarly, conditional on including the share of FRMs in the second step, in countries with
deeper information on borrowers, less riskier households –those between 45 and 54 age or
employees- pay relatively lower mortgage interest rates than young households or than the self-
employed –arguably households with riskier income profiles. In addition, households between 45
and 54 years of age are more likely to borrow and owe higher debt amounts. Those results are
broadly similar to those obtained in the univariate second step.
On the contrary, once we compare countries with a similar prevalence of FRMs, we no longer
detect a statistically significant impact of the existence of a regulatory LTV on the amount
of debt held by the reference group or of higher regulatory Loan to Values on the increased
propensity to borrow among the youngest set of households.36
36The rest of institutions examined, including “prevalence of interest-only mortgages” or “financial literacy” did
not correlate strongly with the age, income or age profiles in the univariate analysis and they still fail to do so
when we control for the share of FRMs.
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In sum, the results in Table A.8 suggest that once we control for the prevalence of FRMs
the “univariate” impacts on the age and income profiles of debt outcomes of longer repossession
periods and on information about borrowers remain basically unchanged. Moreover, the result
that the absence of a limit to mortgage payment exemption increases the amount borrowed by
the reference group still holds.
5.3 Which institutions matter the most?
We conduct a robustness analysis including “time to repossess”, “taxation”, “loan to value ratios”,
an indicator for “fixed rate mortgages exceeding 50 per cent of originations” and “depth of infor-
mation”. The first two institutions are chosen because cross-country variation in these measures
correlates with the fraction of households in the reference group that borrow, with the age or
income profiles of borrowers and with the amount of secured debt held. The effects of “loan to
value” are less robust across specifications, but variation in this institution correlates with the
amount of debt held. Finally, both “depth of information” and “Fixed Rate Mortgages” correlate
with the variation in interest rates, and are thus representing potentially confounding factors.
On the other hand our preferred specification omits “low initial repayments” and “financial lit-
eracy”. The prevalence of interest–only mortgages correlates only weakly with the patterns we
study. Financial literacy is omitted because we do not trust the measure much, and because the
results were not particularly strong at explaining the variation in debt outcomes across groups
of the population. Additionally, our preferred specification uses an indicator of the share of
FRMs exceeding 50 per cent, rather than the actual share. The reason is that the comparable
information we have reflects the situation in 2007. An indicator of prevalence above 50 per cent
is more likely to be stable over time.37
Tables 9.1 to 9.3 show multivariate results allowing for various institutions. Variation in time
of repossession correlates strongly with many of the patterns of interest. A one month longer
repossession period diminishes the chances that the reference group has secured debt by 1 per
cent. Longer repossession periods diminish less the borrowing chances of households above 45
years of age than the chances of the 35-44 group.38 Finally, in terms of the amount borrowed
(conditional on borrowing), while a one month increase in repossession periods does not affect
the amount borrowed by households in the reference group, this does reduce the amount granted
to the youngest households with the rest of covariates held at those of the reference group by
0.008 log points (0.005-0.013). The existing literature has argued that longer repossession periods
lead banks to ration credit by setting higher down-payment requirements. We discuss this issue
below, but note now that our results suggest that longer repossession periods affect the pricing
of loans. In countries with longer repossession periods, banks charge relatively higher interest
rates to low-income households, who, in principle, are most likely to default.
37The main results discussed below are not sensitive to modelling the share of FRMs as a dummy or as a
share. The exception is the impact of the share of FRMs on the higher interest rate charged on the house of main
residence; this result is less precise when we use the actual share.
38The age profile by which older groups are less affected by repossession does not hold in the univariate
specification, so it must be taken with care.
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Mortgage tax exemptions do not robustly predict changes in the participation rate in the
secured credit market. Nevertheless, conditional on borrowing, the average debt amount held by
the reference group is 1.38 log points larger in countries without a limit on mortgage tax exemp-
tions. The effect of tax deductions should, in principle, operate through demand-side effects.39
Weak evidence for such a channel is provided by the positive correlation between interest rates
charged to the reference group and tax deductibility of mortgage payments, consistent with an
increase in demand and an upward-sloping supply curve.40
The role of other regulations is less clear-cut. We mention above that a literature has dis-
cussed that variation in LTVs introduces quantity rationing in the credit market and shapes the
distribution of secured borrowing. Once all institutions are taken into account, if anything, the
absence of regulatory LTVs diminishes the chances of borrowing and the amount borrowed by the
reference group. The existence of a maximum LTV correlates with statistically significant higher
interest rates for the reference group, but that higher cost of debt does not seem to strongly
inhibit the demand for secured credit.
Similarly, and consistent with the existence of simple supply-side effects, the prevalence of
FRMs correlates with higher interest rates charged to the reference group - the effect is 200
basis points, perhaps too large to be credible. Nevertheless, the fraction of borrowers within the
reference group or the amount that this group borrows is not affected. Possibly, as Campbell
and Cocco suggest, there may be a trade-off between relatively higher costs of FRMs and the
stable stream of payment - especially for households with risky income profiles.
5.4 Economic magnitude of the responses
Guided by the discussion of our multivariate results, we next assess the economic impact of “time
to repossess”. Taxation of mortgages also seemed important to understand the distribution of
debt amounts, but delivered imprecise results along a number of important margins – such as
the fraction of borrowers or the distribution of interest rates. In addition, there are important
components of housing taxation that we cannot measure properly – imputed rents or the value-
added tax, for example.
In what follows, we gauge the economic magnitude of the response of various debt outcomes to
a one standard deviation increase in the number of months needed to repossess. That magnitude
is 15 months and is equivalent in distance between the 5 months needed in the Netherlands
and the 20 months needed in France. Fifteen months longer repossession periods decrease the
probability of holding secured debt by between 10 and 16 percentage points – depending on
whether we focus on the univariate or the multivariate estimate. The overall standard deviation
of the predicted probability of holding secured debt by the reference group is also 16 percentage
39Nevertheless, some analysts claim that the supply of secured credit in NL is organized around the generous
tax exemptions to mortgage lending –see Rabobank, 2012.
40Both the increased income of borrowers and the increase in interest rates are present when we replace the tax
dummies with Johansson’s tax relief measure.
36
35
points, suggesting that the variation in “time to repossess” accounts for most of the variation in
the chances of borrowing secured within that reference group.
Regarding the amount of secured debt held, the impacts of time to repossess vary substantially
across cohort/age groups.Conditional on obtaining a secured loan, a 15 months longer reposses-
sion period decreases by 12 per cent the amount of debt held by the set of households aged 16-34
and with characteristics other than age held at those of the reference group.41. Conversely, a one
standard deviation increase in the time to repossess reduces the differential amount of secured
debt borrowed by the 45-54 or 55-64 age groups by 3 per cent. As mentioned above, the simu-
lations of the OLG models in Livshits et al (2007) or Hintermeier and Koeniger (2011) deliver
relatively similar results: the introduction of bankruptcy reduces most the amount borrowed by
households in their 30s and to a lesser extent among older households.
Finally, we compare the predicted interest rate paid by households in the 10th income centile
-and the rest of the covariates held constant at those of the reference group- in two countries:
one with 20 months repossession and another one with 5 months repossession. To that end, we
replace the country specific first stage income coefficient with interest rates in the left hand side
by its projection on a constant and on the number of months to repossess ?i.e., the fitted value
in the second stage. In the country with 15 months longer repossession the household in the
lowest income decile and the rest of covariates held at those of the reference group pays a 0.30
percentage points higher interest rate.42 A similar 0.28 percentage point estimate is obtained
when we evaluate income at the 90th centile of the income distribution.
5.5 A comparison to some previous empirical literature on the impact of
“time to repossess”
Using a cross-country and a cross-Italian province panel dataset, Djankov et al (2007) and
Jappelli et al (2005) respectively assess the impact of various measures of legal enforcement,
for which “time to repossess” is a proxy, on private sector debt-to-GDP ratios. Djankov et al
control, at the same time, for depth of information about borrowers. In both cases the authors
document that aggregate debt-to-GDP ratios diminish with measures of the number of days
needed to enforce a contract; a one year increase in the time to enforce a contract increases
debt-to-GDP ratios by more than 7 percentage points. Our results suggest that, even though
“depth of information” correlates with certain features of the distribution of household debt when
introduced alone in the second stage specification, variation in “time to repossess” is a much more
robust determinant of household debt outcomes across groups of the population in the Euro zone.
41This estimate is obtained by multiplying the impact of one month of repossession on the amount borrowed by
the 16-34 year age group by 15. In turn, the latter impact is obtained by adding the -0.013 coefficient for 16-34
year age group to the 0.005 estimate for the reference group – see Table 9.2, first row, first and second columns.
42This estimate is obtained by multiplying the -0.019 coefficient in the last column first row of Table 9.3 by
15 months (the standard deviation in the time to repossess) times the difference between the 10th centile of the
log-income distribution (9.27) and the median (10.28). We note that log income in the first stage is the difference
between log income of the household and the log median income in the country.
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A study that is methodologically related to ours is Chiuri and Jappelli (2003). The au-
thors derive country-specific age profiles for home ownership, and then relate these profiles to
cross-country variation in the time to repossess. They document that in countries with longer re-
possession processes, the rate of home ownership of households below 45 years of age is relatively
lower. Our results about whether time to repossess affects the age profile of holding debt are
mixed. In the univariate version, we find that longer repossessions result in a drop in access to
mortgages for all age groups holding the rest of characteristics constant at those of the reference
group. A possible explanation for the discrepancy regarding the fraction of borrowers is that we
control for a number of covariates at the household level on top of age – income, labor market
status, education and so on. We also note that the interpretation of the results differs across
studies: while Chiuri and Jappelli stress the role of quantity restrictions (the down-payment),
our results suggest that banks price in the risk of non-repayment by charging relatively higher
mortgage interest rates to low income households.
On a related note, Fabbri and Padula (2003) document that in Italian provinces with a higher
backlog of judicial cases, higher wealth households borrow relatively larger amounts. Gropp et al
(1997) compare US states with different bankruptcy exemption levels and document that greater
exemptions imply that households in the bottom quartiles of the wealth distribution borrow
relatively lower amounts of debt – conditional on borrowing. While we chose not to study wealth
because of simultaneity biases, it is worth noting that we find little evidence that, for example,
longer repossession periods result in a stronger income profile of the amount of secured debt
held. As mentioned in the introduction, a source of discrepancies between our study and those
mentioned above is that we allow for a differential effect for each single covariate in each country,
as theory predicts that differences in bankruptcy institutions affect the distribution of debt along
many dimensions.
Finally, our results on the variation in interest rates complement previous evidence. Gropp
et al (1997) find that an increase in 45.000 dollars bankruptcy exemption across US states
increases interest rates on car loans by 2.5 percentage points for low-wealth households. On
the other hand, however, using a pool of countries, Jappelli et al (2005) document a close-to-
zero correlation between average mortgage interest rate spreads and judicial costs. Regarding
the latter study, our results stress that longer times to repossess increase the income profile of
interest rates, but that does not necessarily result in a different aggregate rate. Compared to
Gropp et al (1997), our estimates suggest that 15 months longer repossession periods increase
the interest rate paid by households in the bottom income decile ?and the rest of covariates held
at those of the reference group- by 0.30 percentage points.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied the distribution of household debt outcomes across euro area countries and
examined the role of institutions in explaining the heterogeneity in the impact of household socio-
economic and demographic characteristics on these debt outcomes. In particular, we analyze the
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role of legal enforcement of contracts, of tax treatment of mortgage payments, loan-to-value ratios
and of information about borrowers in shaping the distribution of the fraction of borrowers, the
amount borrowed and, in the case of secured debt, the mortgage interest rate paid. To that
end, we use a novel household dataset - the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, a
coordinated effort of 15 countries to collect ex-ante harmonized data on household wealth, debt
and income.
In terms of explaining secured debt holdings within countries, our results show that the age,
income and education level of household members are important demographic considerations.
In this context, we find evidence of a hump-shaped profile of secured debt holding over age-
cohort groups; the chances of borrowing peak for cohorts aged 35-44 years, before the (cross-
sectional) income profile peaks, possibly suggesting a role for secured debt in smoothing household
consumption.
We find that while these socio-economic and demographic factors are important correlates of
household debt outcomes, there is considerable heterogeneity in the relative importance of these
factors across the countries in our sample.
While our results show a number of country-level institutions to be correlated with these
effects, in a multivariate setting we find that the length of repossession periods best explains
the features of the distribution of debt that we analyze. In countries with one standard devi-
ation longer repossession procedures we find that the proportion of households with debt is 16
percentage points smaller, the amount borrowed by the youngest set of households (conditional
on borrowing) is 12 per cent lower, and the interest rates paid by low income households are
0.3 percentage points higher when we evaluated impacts at the rest of covariate of the reference
group. These results are robust to the inclusion of other institutions.
One interpretation of our results is that the supply of secured credit is affected by legal
processes that delay the recovery of collateral in the case of non-repayment. In this case, banks
react to expected losses due to longer repossession periods not necessarily by rationing quantities
or rejecting applications but also by pricing secured debt differently across income groups and
charging relatively higher interest rates to low income households.
Finally, we have documented substantial heterogeneity in the distribution of household debt
across countries. Such diversity has implications for a wide array of outcomes that includes
macroeconomic policy - the consequences of an interest rate increase depend on the fraction and
the characteristics of indebted households - as well as financial stability issues – arrears depend on
the income, age and household structure of indebted households. Those outcomes merit further
research.
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Appendix A.1.: On the calculation of standard errors in second-stage regressions
of group effects
In the second stage we regress an estimated intercept or slope β̂c on country-level institutional
indicators zc (including a constant term) to get
γ̂ =
(
Z ′Z
)−1
Z ′β̂
where Z ′Z =
∑C
c=1 zcz
′
c and Z ′β̂ =
∑C
c=1 zcβ̂c.
The quantity β̂c has been estimated using a sample of household survey data of size Nc from
country c. There are C countries in total. The number of countries is small in comparison with
the number of households sampled per country. Here we focus on households and countries, but
the same analysis would apply to micro data on other units with a group structure.
The variance of the second stage estimates is given by the “sandwich” formula
V ar (γ̂) =
(
Z ′Z
)−1( C∑
c=1
V ar
(
β̂c
)
Z ′cZc
)(
Z ′Z
)−1
,
the precise form of which depends on how V ar
(
β̂c
)
is calculated.
In general,
β̂c = βc + êc
where βc is the intercept or slope in the population of households of country c and êc is the
corresponding first-stage estimation error. Moreover,
βc = z
′
cγ + vc
where γ is the regression coefficient of βc on zc in the population of countries and vc is the error
term.
Thus,
V ar
(
β̂c
)
= V ar (vc) + V ar (êc) .
V ar (êc) = ω
2
c , say, is the first-stage sampling variance of β̂c and it is therefore of order 1/Nc. It
differs across countries and is estimated as part of first-stage estimation output. V ar (vc) = s2
is treated as a constant for simplicity (no heteroskedasticity in the regression of βc on zc). An
estimate of s2 is the residual variance of the second stage regression σ̂2 minus the average of
estimated ω2c ’s: ω2c =
∑C
c=1 ω̂
2
c/C. Putting together these ingredientes we get
V̂ ar (γ̂) = σ̂2
(
Z ′Z
)−1
+
(
Z ′Z
)−1( C∑
c=1
ω̂2cZ
′
cZc
)(
Z ′Z
)−1 − ω2c (Z ′Z)−1 ≡ V̂A + V̂B − V̂C .
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VA is the formula on which conventional calculation of second-stage standard errors is based,
ignoring the heteroskedasticity induced by the fact that the β̂c’s are estimated. VB is a valid
formula if βc only depends on observable institutions (under the assumption that βc = z′cγ).
Finally, VC is a correction to avoid over-adjusting for sample error in the β̂c’s.
Note that if ω2c are constant across countries VB = VC , so that V ar (γ̂) = VA. Since in fact
we are using least squares weighted by country sample size we would expect heteroskedasticity
to play a minor role.
When the number of institutions is close or equal to the number of countries, there are no
degrees of freedom to allow for unobservables in the relationship between βc and zc. In those
circumstances the only standard errors available are the ones based exclusively on the standard
errors of the β̂c’s under the assumption that βc = z′cγ, based on the formula
V̂B =
(
Z ′Z
)−1( C∑
c=1
ω̂2cZ
′
cZc
)(
Z ′Z
)−1
.
Sample-average estimands and population-average estimands So far we have been
concerned with estimands that are defined as quantities such as γ, which are measured in a
population of countries. Specifically,
γ =
[
E
(
zcz
′
c
)]−1
E (zcβc)
where the expectations are taken with respect to a population of countries (of which our country
data are regarded as a representative sample). For example, if zc = 1 then γ is just the population
mean of βc:
γ = E (βc) .
An alternative estimand is a sample-average version of the previous population measure:
γC =
(
1
C
C∑
c=1
zcz
′
c
)−1
1
C
C∑
c=1
zcβc.
If βc were observable one could calculate γC without estimation error, but since βc is only
estimated, γ̂ is also subject to sample error as an estimate of γC , although γ̂ will typically be a
much more accurate estimate of γC than is of γ.
In this light, V̂B is the basis for the calculation of standard errors of γ̂ as estimates of γC
whereas V̂A or V̂A + V̂B − V̂C are the basis for calculating standard errors of γ̂ as estimates of γ.
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Using weighted least squares For the weighted least squares estimator we have
γ˜ = M−1zz
C∑
c=1
Nczcβ̂c
where Mzz =
∑C
c=1Nczcz
′
c.
V ar (γ˜) = M−1zz
(
C∑
c=1
V ar
(
β̂c
)
N2c zcz
′
c
)
M−1zz .
Assuming now that V ar (vc) = s2/Nc (no heteroskedasticity in the regression of
√
Ncβc on√
Nczc) and letting ω2c = φ2c/Nc (or SE
(
β̂c
)
= φc/
√
Nc), we get
V̂ ar (γ˜) = σ˜2ξM
−1
zz +M
−1
zz
(
C∑
c=1
φ̂2cNczcz
′
c
)
M−1zz − φ2cM−1zz ≡ V̂A + V̂B − V̂C .
where
σ˜2ξ =
1
C − k
C∑
c=1
Nc
(
β̂c − z′cγ
)2
.
Note that if φ2c is constant for all c then V̂ ar (γ˜) = σ˜2ξM
−1
zz .
To conclude, we are considering two very different ways of calculating second-stage standard
errors:
1. γ˜ as an estimate of a population-average estimand. Here there are two possibilities:
(a) If βc = z′cγ + vc and φ2c constant across countries:
V̂A = σ˜
2
ξM
−1
zz .
(b) If βc = z′cγ + vc and φ2c non-constant:
V̂A + V̂B − V̂C .
2. γ˜ as an estimate of a sample-average estimand:
V̂B = M
−1
zz
(
C∑
c=1
φ̂2cNczcz
′
c
)
M−1zz .
V̂B can be calculated as M−1zz (W ′W )M−1zz where W is a matrix with rows w′c = SE
(
β̂c
)
Ncz
′
c.
For example, if z′c = (1, foreclosc, `tvc), we have
w′c =
(
SE
(
β̂c
)
Nc, SE
(
β̂c
)
Nc × foreclosc, SE
(
β̂c
)
Nc × `tvc
)
.
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Table 2: OVERVIEW OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable Definition
Age_16_34 Dummy variable indicating that the eldest of the core household members is aged between 16 to 34 years.
Age_35_44 Omitted category.
Age_45_54 Dummy variable indicating that the eldest of the core household members is aged between 45 and 54 years.
Age_55_64 Dummy variable indicating that the eldest of the core household members is aged between 55 and 64 years.
Age_Over_64 Dummy variable indicating that eldest of the core household members is older than 64 years.
Age_Differ Continuous variable indicating the difference (in years) between the eldest core household member and the youngest
core household member.
Low_Educ Dummy variable indicating if the most highly educated core household member has a low level of education.
Med_Educ Omitted category.
High_Educ Dummy variable indicating if the most highly educated core household member has a high level of education.
Educ_Differ Dummy variable indicating if the other core member in the couple has a lower education level than the member
captured by the previous dummy variables, where a couple exists.
Self_Employed Dummy variable indicating if the highest income earner among core member  is self-employed.
Employee Omitted category.
Retired Dummy variable indicating if the highest income earner among core members is retired.
Inactive_Unemp Dummy variable indicating if the highest income earner among core members  is inactive or unemployed.
Other_Core_Working Dummy variable indicating if the other core member is employed.
Couple Dummy variable indicating that the household has a couple of core household members.
LnAdults Log of the number of adults in the household
LnIncome Log of total household gross income. This includes income from employment, pensions, social welfare, investments /
savings, private transfers and other sources.
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Table 3.1: INSTITUTIONS AND CREDIT CONDITIONS: DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
Variable Definition Source
Duration of foreclosure
The period typically required for the completion of foreclosure proceeding, taking into account the time needed for
the completion of court proceedings, the sale of the asset and the distribution of the proceeds to the creditors;
measured in number of months.
ESCB1
Cost of foreclosure
The typical cost of a foreclosure procedure, i.e. the total cost of the enforcement procedure borne by the buyers
(e.g. legal, registration, administration or auctioneers' fees), as a percentage of the loan value. ESCB
1
Deductibility of payments
Main features of the deductibility of mortgage payments (interest and/or principal) from personal income tax,
measured as the (non) existence of such deductibility. ESCB
1
Limit on deductibility
Limitations to the deductibility above, in terms of time and or amount (fixed amount, percentage or ceiling),
measured as the (non) existence of such a limit. ESCB
1
Tax relief
The tax favouring of owner-occupied housing with respect to debt financing, looking at whether the interest 
payments on mortgages are deductible from taxable income and if there are limits on the allowed period of 
deduction or on the deductible amount, and looking at whether tax credits on mortgage loans are available. The 
indicator estimates the difference between the market interest rate and the after-tax debt financing cost of housing, 
in percentage points.
OECD2
Existence of LTV limit
Formal restrictions, threshold loan-to-value ratios above which banks are required to provision more capital under
Basle II, or limits applying for loans to be eligible as collateral for covered bonds or mortgage bonds, measured as
the (non) existence of such limits.
ESCB1
LTV limit The value of the limit above, measured as a percentage of the value of the property. ESCB1
Fixed-rate mortgages
The prevalence of housing loans with a longer-term fixation of interest rates. Because of the variability over time of
the share of variable-rate loans (rate fixation up to one year) and loans with relatively short periods of fixed rates,
this variable is measured as the share of loans with very long periods of fixed rates (over ten years), as a percentage
of all housing loans. As such, fixed-rate countries are Belgium, Germany, France and The Netherlands.
ESCB1
Interest-only payments
Interest-only system, defined as a periodical payment of interest with full capital reimbursement at the end of the
contract, measured as the share of such loans in the total being below or above 10%. ESCB
1
Long maturities
Longer-maturity products with an initial maturity of more than 30 years, measured as the percentage share of these 
loans in the total. ESCB
1
Credit information
The depth of credit information on borrowers, i.e. the rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and
accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau,
measured on a scale from 0 to 6.
WB3
Financial literacy
Senior business leaders' evaluation of the statement: "Economic literacy among the population is generally high",
measured on a scale from 0 to 10. IMD
4
Mathematical literacy Students' performance on the mathematical scale of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). OECD2
C. Credit conditions
A. Legal enforcement 
A.1. Foreclosure procedures
B. Regulation: Fiscal and macro-prudential framework
B.1. Taxation of mortgage financing 
B.2. Regulatory loan-to-value ratio
4 Data from the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) of the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), averages for the period 1998-2005, as reportd in Figure 1 of Jappelli 
(2010). 
C.1. Prevalence of fixed interest rates
C.2. Conditions that reduce initial payments
C.3. Financial development and literacy
1 The information comes from the Structural Issues Report: Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, "Housing Finance in the Euro Area", ECB
Occasional Paper N° 101, March 2009; and from the replies from National Central Banks and commercial banks to ad hoc questionnaires that alimented this report. Data refer to originations in
2007.
2 The tax data are taken from Figure 3 in: Andrews, Dan and Aida Caldera Sánchez, "The Evolution of Homeownership Rates in Selected OECD Countries: Demographic and Public Policy
Influences", OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Vol. 2011/4, pp 207-243; and are based on the OECD Housing Market Questionnaire presented in Johansson, Asa, "Housing Policies in OECD
and Candidate for Accession Countries: Survey-Based Data and Implications", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, OECD, Paris, forthcoming. Data refer to 2009. Students'
performance in mathematics is taken from the 2009 PISA. 
3 Data from Chapter 5.5 on financial access, stability and efficiency of: World Bank, "World Development Indicators 2012". The indicator is based on information from banking supervision
authorities and surveys on the public credit registry’s or private credit bureau’s structure, laws and associated rules, administered to the entity itself. It refers to 2011. 
Sources: ESCB, IMD, OECD, World Bank.
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Table 3.2: INSTITUTIONS AND CREDIT CONDITIONS: DATA USED
A. Legal enforcement 
A.1. Foreclosure procedures
Typical duration of a foreclosure procedure 
(in months) 9 18 9 8 20 24 56 12 5 24 …
Typical cost of foreclosure (% of loan) 8 19 8 10 10 16 … 9 4 8 …
B. Regulation: Fiscal and macro-prudential 
framework
B.1. Taxation of mortgage financing 
Existence of tax exemption 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Absence of a limit to deductibility 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
B.2. Regulatory loan-to-value ratio
Existence of LTV limit 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
LTV limit 0 0 60 80 60 75 80 0 0 75 70
C. Credit conditions
C.1. Prevalence of fixed interest rates
Dummy indicating if % of mortgages on 
FR for a period longer than 10 years > 
50% 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
C.2. Conditions that reduce initial 
payments
Dummy indicating if % of mortgages with 
i-only-payments for the first 3 years > 10% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Dummy indicating if % of mortage  with 
maturity of more than 30 years > 25% 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 …
C.3. Financial development and literacy
Depth of credit information index (0-6) 6 4 6 5 4 5 5 5 4 4
Score on the mathematics scale (PISA) 496 515 513 483 497 466 483 489 526 487 497
Sources: ESCB, IMD, OECD, World Bank.
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Table 4: HAS SECURED DEBT
Logit Regressions
Odds-Ratios
Each column shows the country-specific odds-ratio estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a Logit model with the probability
of holding secured debt as a dependent variable and the covariates in the rows as independent variables. The sample includes all
households in the country HFCS. All estimates are weighted by population weights and averaged across the five implicates.
Age_16_34 0.467 0.680 0.412 0.770 0.413 0.623 0.873 0.694 0.736 0.532 1.401
(0.105) (0.154) (0.108) (0.140) (0.042) (0.118) (0.203) (0.182) (0.252) (0.106) (0.284)
Age_45_54 0.633 0.635 1.438 0.483 0.804 0.959 0.835 0.548 1.516 0.662 0.519
(0.119) (0.137) (0.268) (0.072) (0.068) (0.170) (0.137) (0.133) (0.389) (0.101) (0.120)
Age_55_64 0.588 0.238 1.155 0.256 0.555 0.855 0.508 0.623 0.910 0.390 0.257
(0.134) (0.059) (0.237) (0.046) (0.057) (0.191) (0.100) (0.197) (0.238) (0.066) (0.094)
Age_Over_64 0.757 0.072 0.833 0.113 0.218 0.296 0.187 0.196 1.139 0.149 …
(0.258) (0.034) (0.276) (0.027) (0.035) (0.102) (0.057) (0.099) (0.424) (0.038) …
Age_Differ 1.004 1.011 1.005 0.991 0.986 0.982 1.054 1.079 0.987 0.998 0.999
(0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.028) (0.016) (0.032)
Low_Educ 0.899 1.092 0.888 0.826 0.533 0.745 0.797 0.853 0.855 0.740 0.788
(0.240) (0.307) (0.283) (0.130) (0.051) (0.123) (0.129) (0.203) (0.175) (0.114) (0.849)
High_Educ 1.382 1.489 1.322 1.112 1.204 0.944 1.029 0.999 1.733 0.950 1.318
(0.282) (0.241) (0.202) (0.166) (0.089) (0.145) (0.156) (0.224) (0.337) (0.166) (0.252)
Educ_Differ 0.883 0.889 0.911 1.156 0.944 0.939 1.259 1.270 1.152 1.538 1.424
(0.168) (0.166) (0.148) (0.161) (0.070) (0.144) (0.180) (0.300) (0.238) (0.200) (0.350)
Self_Employed 1.163 1.067 1.325 0.876 1.300 0.804 1.018 0.800 0.782 0.732 1.712
(0.259) (0.353) (0.334) (0.148) (0.125) (0.128) (0.167) (0.243) (0.359) (0.124) (0.387)
Retired 0.447 0.617 0.537 0.630 0.717 1.134 0.772 0.332 0.645 0.568 0.242
(0.127) (0.239) (0.151) (0.140) (0.092) (0.290) (0.199) (0.136) (0.206) (0.118) (0.260)
Inactive_Unemp 0.810 0.365 0.418 0.704 0.362 1.009 0.719 0.315 0.665 0.558 0.816
(0.260) (0.099) (0.116) (0.116) (0.051) (0.282) (0.204) (0.142) (0.186) (0.111) (0.396)
Other_Core_Working 1.802 1.989 1.291 0.940 1.763 1.206 1.607 1.524 1.548 1.457 1.340
(0.356) (0.416) (0.231) (0.128) (0.139) (0.182) (0.242) (0.372) (0.349) (0.202) (0.357)
Couple 0.957 0.783 0.601 0.343 0.577 0.443 1.103 1.857 0.490 0.908 0.265
(0.241) (0.222) (0.160) (0.066) (0.072) (0.092) (0.239) (0.637) (0.183) (0.169) (0.094)
LnAdults 1.989 0.835 1.216 0.513 0.609 1.500 0.842 1.258 1.365 0.859 0.394
(0.501) (0.202) (0.293) (0.096) (0.073) (0.286) (0.169) (0.366) (0.486) (0.149) (0.119)
LnIncome 1.441 1.577 2.327 1.956 1.889 1.277 1.947 2.015 1.255 1.684 0.870
(0.324) (0.149) (0.323) (0.201) (0.121) (0.151) (0.238) (0.356) (0.194) (0.172) (0.168)
Cons 0.326 0.881 0.299 1.847 0.646 0.422 0.133 0.870 1.014 0.898 0.218
(0.073) (0.229) (0.070) (0.339) (0.066) (0.074) (0.026) (0.260) (0.293) (0.179) (0.063)
Pseudo-R2 0.139 0.289 0.211 0.229 0.208 0.091 0.149 0.203 0.114 0.211 0.119
NL PT SK
                                
                   COUNTRY
CONTROL 
VARIABLES
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Table 5: DEBT BALANCE OF SECURED DEBT
OLS estimates
Each column shows the country-specific estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of an OLS model where the logarithm of the
amount of secured debt is the dependent variable and the covariates in the rows are the independent variables. The sample includes
only the households who report holding secured debt. All estimates are weighted by population weights and averaged across the five
implicates.
Age_16_34 0.209 0.566 0.157 0.673 0.362 0.177 0.026 0.358 0.201 0.398 0.104
(0.239) (0.092) (0.251) (0.112) (0.072) (0.135) (0.314) (0.126) (0.114) (0.090) (0.165)
Age_45_54 -0.533 -0.654 -0.232 -0.006 -0.599 -0.076 -0.405 -0.656 -0.403 -0.535 -0.323
(0.237) (0.118) (0.159) (0.113) (0.069) (0.167) (0.177) (0.159) (0.107) (0.093) (0.279)
Age_55_64 -0.967 -0.964 -0.464 -0.241 -0.926 -0.172 -0.642 -1.040 -0.470 -1.028 -1.209
(0.312) (0.162) (0.186) (0.126) (0.100) (0.221) (0.190) (0.210) (0.110) (0.130) (0.345)
Age_Over_64 -0.833 -1.429 -0.599 -0.005 -1.328 -0.680 -0.867 -0.586 -0.468 -1.226 …
(0.423) (0.365) (0.274) (0.250) (0.175) (0.363) (0.266) (0.457) (0.168) (0.290) …
Age_Differ 0.030 0.040 0.023 0.018 0.050 0.013 0.037 0.022 -0.007 0.018 0.039
(0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.035)
Low_Educ -0.227 0.090 -0.367 0.027 -0.093 -0.492 0.054 0.059 -0.166 -0.062 0.333
(0.453) (0.190) (0.503) (0.117) (0.099) (0.156) (0.156) (0.158) (0.101) (0.094) (0.784)
High_Educ 0.125 0.165 0.238 0.023 0.146 -0.140 0.401 0.075 0.258 0.196 0.238
(0.314) (0.099) (0.131) (0.111) (0.059) (0.128) (0.167) (0.136) (0.095) (0.094) (0.190)
Educ_Differ -0.248 -0.194 -0.107 -0.101 -0.073 -0.011 -0.115 0.026 -0.220 -0.021 -0.277
(0.249) (0.107) (0.142) (0.095) (0.058) (0.129) (0.168) (0.144) (0.091) (0.082) (0.281)
Self_Employed 0.046 0.308 0.189 0.193 0.244 0.076 0.024 0.534 0.316 0.493 -0.097
(0.259) (0.140) (0.154) (0.115) (0.077) (0.130) (0.210) (0.228) (0.336) (0.096) (0.242)
Retired -0.426 0.538 0.061 -0.099 -0.278 -0.649 -0.111 -0.178 -0.236 -0.210 0.175
(0.330) (0.294) (0.223) (0.235) (0.131) (0.263) (0.246) (0.287) (0.140) (0.239) (0.372)
Inactive_Unemp -0.221 -0.018 0.172 0.139 -0.245 -0.081 -0.196 -0.685 -0.166 -0.049 0.226
(0.382) (0.231) (0.286) (0.112) (0.153) (0.197) (0.337) (0.309) (0.123) (0.164) (0.376)
Other_Core_Working -0.121 0.208 0.191 0.219 -0.136 0.075 0.098 0.276 0.100 -0.100 0.217
(0.221) (0.136) (0.174) (0.098) (0.068) (0.146) (0.152) (0.179) (0.093) (0.094) (0.269)
Couple 0.666 -0.203 -0.293 -0.352 -0.044 0.106 -0.251 -0.175 0.030 -0.127 -0.007
(0.279) (0.196) (0.238) (0.141) (0.123) (0.172) (0.231) (0.219) (0.176) (0.146) (0.340)
LnAdults -0.306 -0.063 -0.244 0.085 -0.076 -0.321 0.002 -0.252 0.137 0.076 -0.230
(0.272) (0.167) (0.177) (0.134) (0.113) (0.194) (0.219) (0.178) (0.184) (0.131) (0.278)
LnIncome 0.374 0.174 0.398 0.391 0.474 -0.027 0.161 0.351 0.067 0.260 0.127
(0.194) (0.083) (0.092) (0.080) (0.060) (0.089) (0.133) (0.094) (0.070) (0.070) (0.252)
Cons 10.840 10.720 10.770 10.390 10.670 10.750 10.690 11.540 11.890 10.740 9.693
(0.481) (0.156) (0.222) (0.152) (0.089) (0.169) (0.175) (0.198) (0.144) (0.128) (0.347)
R-Squared 0.188 0.265 0.152 0.112 0.240 0.234 0.111 0.316 0.255 0.266 0.128
NL PT SK
                                
                   COUNTRY
CONTROL 
VARIABLES
AT BE DE ES FR GR IT LU
52
51
Table 6: CURRENT INTEREST RATE OF HMR MORTGAGE
OLS estimates
Each column shows the country-specific estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of an OLS model where the interest rate is the
dependent variable and the covariates in the rows are the independent variables. The sample includes only the households who report
holding secured debt. All estimates are weighted by population weights and averaged across the five implicates.
Age_16_34 0.413 -0.153 -0.168 -0.103 -0.204 0.105 0.006 -0.221 -0.456 0.243
(0.462) (0.198) (0.193) (0.196) (0.092) (0.316) (0.463) (0.167) (0.198) (0.288)
Age_45_54 -0.187 0.411 -0.160 -0.148 0.243 0.668 0.175 0.205 -0.030 -0.150
(0.612) (0.214) (0.113) (0.168) (0.106) (0.344) (0.328) (0.158) (0.154) (0.258)
Age_55_64 -0.427 0.541 -0.020 0.069 0.474 0.598 0.578 0.382 -0.078 0.401
(0.766) (0.232) (0.171) (0.268) (0.153) (0.463) (0.558) (0.224) (0.162) (0.331)
Age_Over_64 0.086 0.489 0.211 0.056 0.855 0.248 -0.015 0.866 -0.219 -0.073
(0.780) (0.770) (0.393) (0.346) (0.441) (0.760) (0.757) (0.642) (0.216) (0.614)
Age_Differ -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 -0.075 -0.049 -0.030 0.018 -0.059
(0.055) (0.026) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.045) (0.040) (0.019) (0.017) (0.032)
Low_Educ 0.041 -0.008 -0.101 -0.061 -0.194 -0.142 0.300 -0.083 0.083 0.268
(0.887) (0.335) (0.291) (0.195) (0.196) (0.344) (0.378) (0.201) (0.142) (0.208)
High_Educ 0.146 0.135 0.040 -0.005 -0.284 -0.219 0.331 0.170 0.135 0.209
(0.600) (0.192) (0.128) (0.166) (0.080) (0.271) (0.291) (0.154) (0.121) (0.211)
Educ_Differ 0.235 -0.273 0.058 -0.175 0.075 0.251 0.156 -0.139 -0.033 -0.334
(0.400) (0.183) (0.114) (0.159) (0.087) (0.248) (0.324) (0.177) (0.122) (0.184)
Self_Employed 0.113 0.059 0.336 0.131 -0.031 0.570 0.513 -0.152 0.219 -0.296
(0.571) (0.253) (0.152) (0.226) (0.096) (0.273) (0.373) (0.131) (0.339) (0.216)
Retired -0.112 0.387 -0.233 0.470 -0.491 -0.159 -0.151 0.106 -0.091 -0.208
(0.617) (0.702) (0.352) (0.344) (0.289) (0.598) (0.608) (0.476) (0.210) (0.517)
Inactive_Unemp 0.112 -0.450 0.053 0.157 0.131 -0.613 -0.119 -0.503 -0.209 -0.212
(0.816) (0.477) (0.408) (0.200) (0.288) (0.583) (0.605) (0.257) (0.193) (0.409)
Other_Core_Working -0.216 -0.058 0.112 -0.025 -0.130 0.180 -0.024 0.391 -0.071 -0.517
(0.381) (0.251) (0.151) (0.159) (0.114) (0.272) (0.321) (0.184) (0.142) (0.275)
Couple 0.270 -0.156 0.055 0.023 0.170 0.228 0.744 0.060 -0.093 -0.033
(0.529) (0.436) (0.202) (0.249) (0.190) (0.406) (0.499) (0.251) (0.215) (0.428)
LnAdults -0.134 0.066 0.197 0.346 0.156 0.050 0.683 0.249 -0.080 1.291
(0.543) (0.331) (0.173) (0.280) (0.204) (0.459) (0.490) (0.210) (0.182) (0.479)
LnIncome -0.098 -0.074 -0.148 -0.170 -0.133 -0.279 -1.085 -0.285 0.014 -0.333
(0.344) (0.161) (0.105) (0.135) (0.066) (0.335) (0.294) (0.114) (0.130) (0.156)
Cons 3.318 4.053 4.641 4.208 4.370 4.002 4.423 2.452 4.622 3.033
(1.997) (0.312) (0.150) (0.244) (0.132) (0.312) (0.379) (0.202) (0.200) (0.351)
R-Squared 0.047 0.060 0.043 0.029 0.049 0.068 0.124 0.110 0.034 0.092
NL PT
                                
                   COUNTRY
CONTROL 
VARIABLES
AT BE DE ES FR GR IT LU
53
52
Table 7: HAS SECURED DEBT: EXPLORING LIFECYCLE MODEL WITH HUMAN CAPITAL
Logit Regressions (Odds-Ratios)
Each column shows the country-specific odds-ratios and standard errors (in parentheses) of the interactions between age group and an
indicator that the core household member with the highest schooling has a college degree. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the
household has secured debt, and zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a Logit. The covariates in Table 4 are included, but not
shown.
Variables2 AT BE DE ES FR GR IT LU NL PT SK
High_Educ*Age16_34 1.21 1.76 2.04 1.19 1.41 0.66 1.12 0.87 2.82 0.85 1.05
(0.57) (0.60) (0.94) (0.37) (0.24) (0.22) (0.54) (0.37) (1.93) (0.32) (0.28)
High_Educ*Age35_44 0.95 2.04 1.29 1.07 1.17 0.77 1.05 1.27 2.03 1.08 2
(0.30) (0.65) (0.37) (0.25) (0.14) (0.20) (0.28) (0.46) (0.77) (0.32) (0.63)
High_Educ*Age_over_44 1.79 1.17 1.26 1.11 1.14 1.24 1 0.92 1.45 0.93 1.16
(0.49) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) (0.11) (0.26) (0.18) (0.28) (0.30) (0.19) (0.40)
Countries
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Table 9.1: Multivariate analysis: HAS SECURED DEBT
Each column shows the OLS estimates and the standard error (in parentheses) of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is
the probability of holding secured debt by the reference group (RG column) or the odds ratio of a specific coefficient of the first step
(rest of columns) and the covariates are the institutions in the rows. A constant is included in all regressions, but not reported. The
sample contains 11 countries. One asterisk indicates a statistically significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level.
RG SELFEMP INCOME
CONTROL VARIABLES 16_34 45_54 55-64 Over_64 Low High
Duration of Foreclosure -0.011* 0.002 0.006* 0.004* 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Existence of Tax Exemption 0.061 0.182 -0.860 -0.486 -0.665 -0.322 0.004 0.519 -0.261
(0.142) (0.356) (0.502) (0.399) (0.477) (0.478) (0.548) (0.590) (0.621)
Existence of Limit to Deductibility 0.033 -0.012 0.833 0.432 1.008 -0.253 0.204 -0.408 -0.122
(0.206) (0.608) (0.876) (0.550) (0.911) (0.617) (0.840) (0.949) (0.530)
Existence of Regulatory LTV Limit 0.321 0.397 0.573 0.147 0.330 -0.313 -0.010 -0.378 0.538
(0.206) (0.608) (0.875) (0.551) (0.912) (0.617) (0.839) (0.947) (0.532)
Value of LTV Regulatory Limit 0.019 0.033 0.020 -0.009 0.009 0.012 0.014 -0.030 0.013
(0.206) (0.607) (0.877) (0.550) (0.911) (0.618) (0.841) (0.949) (0.531)
Fixed Interest Rate 0.158 0.391 0.484 0.064 0.214 -0.026 0.451 0.127 0.376
(0.207) (0.608) (0.875) (0.550) (0.911) (0.617) (0.837) (0.948) (0.532)
Depth of Credit Information Index -0.109 0.103 -0.089 0.070 -0.024 0.013 0.054 0.297 0.108
(0.206) (0.609) (0.876) (0.550) (0.911) (0.618) (0.836) (0.946) (0.529)
AGE EDUCATION
Table 9.2: Multivariate analysis: SECURED DEBT BALANCE
Each column shows the OLS estimates and the standard error (in parentheses) of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the
country-specific constant (RG column) or the specific coefficient of the first step (rest of columns) and the covariates are the institutions
in the rows. A constant is included in all regressions, but not reported. The sample contains 11 countries. One asterisk indicates a
statistically significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level.
RG SELFEMP INCOME
CONTROL VARIABLES 16_34 45_54 55-64 Over_64 Low High
Duration of Foreclosure 0.005 -0.013* -0.009* -0.009* -0.018* 0.002 0.008* -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Existence of Tax Exemption -0.817 0.273 0.349 0.692 0.613 0.082 -0.494 -0.712 0.196
(0.507) (0.417) (0.356) (0.457) (0.842) (0.704) (0.344) (0.416) (0.243)
Existence of Limit to Deductibility 1.380* -0.394 -0.256 -0.336 0.171 0.041 0.458 0.373 -0.015
(0.446) (0.329) (0.348) (0.425) (0.810) (0.403) (0.301) (0.764) (0.228)
Existence of Regulatory LTV Limit 0.572 0.037 0.558 0.874* 1.556 0.243 0.227 0.115 0.068
(0.446) (0.328) (0.347) (0.425) (0.807) (0.405) (0.301) (0.767) (0.228)
Value of LTV Regulatory Limit 0.031 0.011 0.024 0.040 0.071 0.022 0.014 0.009 -0.011
(0.446) (0.327) (0.347) (0.424) (0.807) (0.405) (0.302) (0.765) (0.227)
Fixed Interest Rate 0.430 0.072 0.267 0.682 0.891 0.293 0.178 -0.134 0.015
(0.447) (0.329) (0.348) (0.425) (0.808) (0.404) (0.300) (0.766) (0.228)
Depth of Credit Information Index -0.338 -0.033 0.306 0.517 0.573 -0.079 -0.150 -0.402 0.047
(0.446) (0.329) (0.348) (0.425) (0.807) (0.405) (0.301) (0.764) (0.228)
AGE EDUCATION
56
55
Table 9.3: Multivariate analysis: HMR INTEREST RATE
Each column shows the OLS estimates and the standard error (in parentheses) of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the
country-specific constant (RG column) or the specific coefficient of the first step (rest of columns) and the covariates are the institutions
in the rows. A constant is included in all regressions, but not reported. The sample contains 11 countries. One asterisk indicates a
statistically significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level.
RG SELFEMP INCOME
CONTROL VARIABLES 16_34 45_54 55-64 Over_64 Low High
Duration of Foreclosure 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.012 -0.002 0.007 0.006 0.009 -0.019*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Existence of Tax Exemption 1.578 -0.320 0.923 0.174 1.403 -0.799 -0.901 0.645 0.120
(1.358) (0.749) (0.711) (0.930) (1.585) (0.784) (0.617) (0.653) (0.472)
Existence of Limit to Deductibility -0.324 -0.143 -0.715 -0.416 -1.093 0.513 0.363 -0.326 -0.120
(0.777) (0.514) (0.485) (0.588) (1.239) (0.568) (0.414) (0.627) (0.358)
Existence of Regulatory LTV Limit 1.517 -0.785 -0.423 -0.041 -0.747 0.116 -0.013 0.219 -0.275
(0.778) (0.513) (0.485) (0.588) (1.239) (0.566) (0.413) (0.626) (0.359)
Value of LTV Regulatory Limit 0.060 -0.037 -0.013 0.002 -0.056 0.016 0.021 0.016 -0.013
(0.778) (0.514) (0.484) (0.587) (1.241) (0.569) (0.414) (0.625) (0.358)
Fixed Interest Rate 2.262* -0.985 0.254 0.160 0.083 -0.197 -0.156 0.550 -0.064
(0.778) (0.513) (0.485) (0.588) (1.239) (0.568) (0.415) (0.627) (0.359)
Depth of Credit Information Index 0.949 -0.129 0.292 -0.105 0.372 -0.311 -0.248 0.547 -0.054
(0.779) (0.512) (0.485) (0.590) (1.240) (0.569) (0.413) (0.627) (0.360)
AGE EDUCATION
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Figure 2: HAS SECURED DEBT. Logit Regressions. Odds-Ratios
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FIGURE 2: HAS SECURED DEBT
Logit Regressions
Odds-Ratios
Odds-ratio estimates and standard errors shown in Table 4. The first panel on the left plots the predicted probability of holding secured
debt for the reference group in each country.
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Figure 3: DEBT BALANCE OF SECURED DEBT. (Location-scale model)
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FIGURE 3: DEBT BALANCE OF SECURED DEBT
(Location-scale model)
OLS estimates and standard errors in Table 5. The triangles are the coefficients of a regression of the absolute value of the OLS residual
on the covariates shown in Table 2. Full triangles denote that the estimate is statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level.
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Figure 4: DEBT BALANCE OF SECURED DEBT. Quantile Regressions
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FIGURE 4
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
TOTAL OUTSTANDING BALANCE OF SECURED DEBT
Country-specific quantile regression functions of the log-amount of secured debt on each covariate.
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Figure 5: CURRENT INTEREST LOAN OF HMR MORTGAGE. (Location-scale model)
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FIGURE 8: CURRENT INTEREST LOAN OF HMR
(Location-scale model)
OLS estimates and standard errors shown in Table 6. The triangles are the coefficients of a regression of the absolute value of the
OLS residual on the covariates shown in Table 2. Full triangles denote that the estimate is statistically different from zero at the 5%
confidence level.
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Figure 6: HAS UNSECURED DEBT. Logit Regressions. Odds-Ratios
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FIGURE 5: HAS UNSECURED DEBT
Logit Regressions
Odds-Ratios
Country-specific odds-ratios and standard errors in a Logit model of the probability of holding unsecured debt. The first panel in the
left plots the predicted probability of holding unsecured debt for the reference group in each country
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Figure 7: DEBT BALANCE OF UNSECURED DEBT
(Location-scale model)
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FIGURE 6: DEBT BALANCE OF UNSECURED DEBT
(Location-scale model)
OLS estimates and standard errors in a model of the log-amount of unsecured debt held. The triangles are the coefficients of a regression
of the absolute value of the OLS residual on the covariates shown in Table 2. Full triangles denote that the estimate is statistically
different from zero at the 5% confidence level.
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Figure 8: DEBT BALANCE OF UNSECURED DEBT
Quantile Regressions
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FIGURE 7
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
TOTAL OUTSTANDING BALANCE OF UNSECURED DEBT
Country-specific quantile regression functions of the log-amount of unsecured debt on each covariate
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Figure 9: ESTIMATED PROFILES OF THE PROBABILITY OF HOLDING DEBT
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The Figure shows the predicted probability of holding secured debt for various groups of the population. The top three charts evaluate
the probability at different ages of the oldest person in the household. The charts in the middle evaluate the chances of holding secured
debt at different income quartiles and the bottom ones at different education levels. The rest of the covariates are those of the reference
group.
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Figure 10: DURATION OF FORECLOSURE (number of months)
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure'10a:'Time'to'Foreclosure'(number'of'months)''Holding'Debt'Scatterplot'
'' Figure'10b:'Time'to'Foreclosure'(number'of'months)'Secured'Debt'Balance'Scatterplot'
''Figure'10c:'Time'to'Foreclosure'(number'of'months)'Current'HMR'Interest'Rate'
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Figure 11.1: TAXATION OF MORTGAGE PAYMENTS.
Existence of tax exemption (controlling for the existence of limit to deductibility)
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 11.2: TAXATION OF MORTGAGE PAYMENTS.
Absence of a limit to tax deductibility (controlling for the existence of tax exemption)
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 12.1: REGULATORY LOAN TO VALUES RATIO
Existence of a regulatory LTV limit (controlling for the value of LTV regulatory limit)
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 12.2: REGULATORY LOAN TO VALUES RATIO
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
72
71
Figure 13: FIXED INTEREST RATE
Dummy indicating if % of mortgages on FR for a period longer than 10 year is > 50%
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 14: CONDITIONS THAT REDUCE INITIAL DEBT REPAYMENTS
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
74
73
Figure 15: INFORMATION ON BORROWERS
Depth of credit information index (0-6)
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 16: INFORMATION ON BORROWERS
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 17: FINANCIAL LITERACY
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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Figure 18: FINANCIAL LITERACY
WCY Measure of financial literacy (0-10)
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Each graph shows the OLS coefficient and its 95% CI in a regression of the first-step coefficient of the variable in the horizontal axis on
the institution that gives title to the figure. The estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 8.
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